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A TAXONOMY OF TESTAMENTARY INTENT
Mark Glover*

INTRODUCTION
“Intention being the life and soul of a will, it can hardly be imagined, I
presume, that a man can make a will without intending to do so, or give by
it more than he means to give.”1 In this statement, Justice Carr of the Supreme Court of Virginia identifies a fundamental principle within the law of
succession, namely that intent, or more specifically testamentary intent, is
the cornerstone of a will.2 This principle was ingrained in the law long before Justice Carr made his proclamation in 1834, and it persists today.3 Indeed, a will’s validity and the ultimate disposition of the decedent’s estate
continue to turn upon the decedent’s testamentary intent.
Despite the importance of testamentary intent, a single cohesive understanding of the principle is elusive. Courts espouse the significance of
testamentary intent but often conflate various conceptions of the term.4 For
example, Justice Carr’s explanation of the principle contains two separate
ideas. First, the law validates a will only if the testator intends the document
to constitute a legally effective will.5 Second, a will can dispose of property
only in the manner in which the testator intended.6
Legal scholars have done little to clarify the contours of testamentary
intent. When referencing the principle, they often follow the lead of their
jurist counterparts and confuse or combine different ideas. For instance,
mirroring Justice Carr’s understanding, Professor John Langbein explains
that the principle of testamentary intent encapsulates “two broad issues . . . :

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. LL.M. 2011, Harvard Law
School; J.D. 2008, magna cum laude, Boston University School of Law; B.A. 2002, Washington University in St. Louis. Thanks to the participants at the Central States Law School Association scholarship
conference for helpful feedback and to the University of Wyoming College of Law for research support.
1 Boisseau v. Aldridges, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 222, 234 (1834) (emphasis added).
2 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. g
(AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“To be a will, the document must be executed by the decedent with testamentary intent . . . .”).
3 Compare Arndt v. Arndt, 1 Serg. & Rawle 256, 263 (Pa. 1815) (“It is not his will, say its opponents, because, from the evidence, it appears that the animus testandi was wanting. This is resting the
cause on its true point.”), with Thomas v. Copenhaver, 365 S.E.2d 760, 762 (Va. 1988) (“To be a valid
will, the writing must have been executed with testamentary intent.”).
4 See infra Section I.A.
5 See Boisseau, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) at 234.
6 See id.
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did the decedent intend to make a will, and if so, what are its terms?”7 Both
Justice Carr and Professor Langbein include the intent to make a will and
the intent to make specific dispositions of property under the general umbrella of testamentary intent. But are both properly understood as elements
of testamentary intent? If so, what is the relationship between the two?
Moreover, are these the only components of testamentary intent? Or are
there more?
The answers to these questions are not readily apparent from case law
or from legal scholarship. Unfortunately, confusion regarding the meaning
of this fundamental principle results in misapplication of doctrine and misunderstanding within the scholarly discourse of the law.8 As Professor
Katheleen Guzman explains, “jurisprudential incoherence” has resulted
from a “haphazardly defined and applied” testamentary intent doctrine, and
“[t]he history of relevant litigation displays that [this incoherence] is nothing new.”9 Because of the prominent role that the testamentary intent doctrine plays within the law of wills, Guzman concludes that “[a] deepened
understanding of testamentary intent has always been worth the effort.”10
Recognizing the importance of testamentary intent and the persistent
uncertainty surrounding it, this Article seeks to cultivate a deeper understanding of the doctrine by untangling the various strands of testamentary
intent. It does so by developing a taxonomy of testamentary intent that can
provide guidance to courts charged with evaluating the validity and meaning of wills as well as clarity to the theoretical discussion of the law in this
area. With a better understanding of the various strands of testamentary
intent and the relationship among them, a more coherent and consistent
body of law can develop.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I lays the foundation for the
taxonomy by describing the general testamentary intent requirement and
prior attempts to decipher the meaning of the term. Part II develops the taxonomy by identifying the three primary strands of testamentary intent, including donative testamentary intent, operative testamentary intent, and
substantive testamentary intent. Finally, Part III examines the implications
of the taxonomy. Specifically, it explains how the taxonomy can bring
clarity and consistency to various components of the law of wills and therefore how the taxonomy can foster jurisprudential coherence within the testamentary intent doctrine.

7

See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491

(1975).
8

See infra Part III.
Katheleen R. Guzman, Intents and Purposes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 307-08 (2011); see also
James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1992) (“Unfortunately, testamentary intent is not well understood or defined.”).
10 Guzman, supra note 9, at 308.
9

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2590209

2016]

I.

A TAXONOMY OF TESTAMENTARY INTENT

571

THE CONFUSION

The requirement that a valid will be executed with testamentary intent,11 or in its Latin form, animus testandi,12 appears in a long line of case
law.13 In an early example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained:
“Though no particular form of words is necessary to give validity to a will,
yet all the books agree, that the animus testandi is an indispensable ingredient.”14 In some states, this testamentary intent requirement is implicit in
probate statutes that place the burden of establishing the lack of testamentary intent on the will’s contestant15 or that set forth the types of evidence
that can be used to establish testamentary intent.16 South Dakota goes further and makes the requirement more explicit by placing the element of
testamentary intent into the statutory definition of a “will.”17 But regardless
of where this requirement appears, all states mandate that the decedent execute a will with testamentary intent.

11

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. g
(AM. LAW INST. 1999).
12 See, e.g., Little v. Sugg, 8 So. 2d 866, 881 (Ala. 1942) (“If a will is procured by undue influence, it is not essential that the beneficiary participated in thus procuring it. If it is so procured, the
animus testandi is absent, regardless of who may be the guilty agent.”); Diane J. Klein, How to Do
Things with Wills, 32 WHITTIER L. REV. 455, 471-72 (2011) (“The presence of animus testandi is the
most important . . . will-making requirement; it is a sine qua non of will-making.”).
13 See, e.g., Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, 189 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Ark. 2004) (“To be valid as
a will, an instrument must be executed with testamentary intent . . . .”); Utay v. Urbish, 433 S.W.2d 905,
909 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968) (“An instrument is not a will unless it is executed with testamentary
intent.”); Mitchell v. Donohue, 34 P. 614, 615 (Cal. 1893) (“No particular words are necessary to show
a testamentary intent.”); Case of Barnet’s Appeal, 3 Rawle 15, 20 (Pa. 1831) (“It seems that nothing has
been settled as universally true, but that the animus testandi must have been present.”).
14 Stein’s Lessee v. North, 3 Yeates 324, 325 (Pa. 1802) (per curiam).
15 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.170 (2014); CAL. PROB. CODE § 8252 (West 1991 & Supp.
2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-407 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:3-407 (LexisNexis 2015);
IDAHO CODE § 15-3-407 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-407 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.3407 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-407 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3310 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-407 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-15-07 (2010); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-3-407 (2009 & Supp. 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-3-407 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §
75-3-407 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 2015).
16 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111 (West 2009); 15 GUAM CODE ANN. § 611 (2005). Reference to testamentary intent in state statutes occasionally appears in other contexts. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 13.12.545 (2014); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6226 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.440
(West 2003 & Supp. 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-3-604 (2015).
17 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-1-201(52) (2004 & Supp. 2015) (“‘Will’ means an instrument,
including a codicil, executed with testamentary intent . . . .”).
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Obscurity Persisted

Despite the importance of testamentary intent, courts have done little
to clarify the meaning of the requirement. As one prominent treatise explains:
The courts have said again and again that the test whether or not an instrument is testamentary . . . is whether it was executed with . . . testamentary intent. While this is a standard
form of orthodox statement, it is in itself of little help since it does not explain what . . . tes18
tamentary intent is.

Indeed, some courts have espoused the fundamental status of testamentary
intent without delineating the contours of the term.19 For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explains that “[t]estamentary intent is the very
breath of life of a will.”20 But despite referencing testamentary intent multiple times, the court does not explain the requirement.21
By contrast, some courts do attempt to define the meaning of testamentary intent. One California Court of Appeals explains that “‘[n]o particular words are necessary to show a testamentary intent’ as long as the record demonstrates that the decedent intended the document to be his or her
last will and testament.”22 That testamentary intent would entail the intent to
make a will may be intuitive, but such an explanation directly conflicts with
how other courts have defined the requirement.23 For instance, one Texas

18 1 WILLIAM H. PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 5.6, at 175-76 (rev. ed. 2003) (footnote
omitted); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 264 (8th ed. 2009) (“There are many possible components to testamentary intent: intent that a
document be used as evidence after death, intent that a document convey no present interest, intent that
it be a will, intent that it not be a will substitute, intent to execute a document, intent that it be final
unless later revoked, intent that after death certain beneficiaries receive certain property, and so on.”);
Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017 (“Unfortunately, testamentary intent is not well understood or defined.”).
19 See, e.g., Minton v. Minton, 374 S.W.3d 818, 821-22 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010); Succession of
Gourgis, 1 So. 3d 528, 533 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Succession of Mott, 715 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (La. Ct.
App. 1998); Garner v. Williams, No. 5, 1986 WL 4604, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1986).
20 In re Sunday’s Estate, 31 A. 353, 356 (Pa. 1895).
21 See id. at 355-56.
22 Gularte v. Pradia (In re Estate of Stoker), 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(quoting Di Paulo v. Wittmer (In re Wunderle’s Estate), 181 P.2d 874, 878 (Cal. 1947)); see Biddle v.
Biddle, 36 Md. 630, 637 (1872) (“[T]he testator must . . . have the intention to make his will . . . .”);
Simonelli v. Chiarolanza, 810 A.2d 604, 608 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“[T]estamentary intent
concerns whether the document was intended to be a will.”).
23 In fact, the California Court of Appeal’s articulation of testamentary intent conflicts with the
explanation found in the case to which it cites. Compare In re Estate of Stoker, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 536
(citing In re Wunderle’s Estate, 181 P.2d at 878) (explaining that the decedent must intend “the document to be his or her last will and testament”), with In re Wunderle’s Estate, 181 P.2d at 878 (explaining
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Court of Appeals takes the view that “[t]estamentary intent does not depend
on the testator’s realization that he is making a will.”24 Instead, the court
explains that testamentary intent refers to the testator’s “intent to express
his testamentary wishes in the instrument offered for probate.”25 Therefore,
whereas the California court suggests that the decedent must intend the
document to be a will, the Texas court explains that the decedent must
simply intend the document to operate as a will. This distinction is subtle,
but it results in conflicting understandings of the testamentary intent requirement.
Furthermore, this distinction is not the only divergence of understanding that one finds in the case law involving testamentary intent. For instance, one California court explains that a long line of cases holds “that, in
order for a document to be the last will of a deceased person, it must appear
therefrom that the decedent intended by the very paper itself to make a disposition of his property in favor of the party claiming thereunder.”26 Under
such an understanding, when discerning the decedent’s testamentary intent,
the court’s primary task is to identify whether the decedent intended a particular document to constitute a legally effective will.
An understanding of testamentary intent that focuses on a specific
document may seem straightforward. However, other courts directly contradict this understanding. For example, the New York Court of Appeals
explains that “it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator was
possessed of testamentary intent, however, we decline the formalistic view
that this intent attaches irrevocably to the document prepared, rather than
the testamentary scheme it reflects.”27 In contrast to the California court,
which focused on the document that is purported to be a will, the New York

that the decedent must intend “to make a disposition of his property after his death in favor of the party
claiming thereunder”).
24 In re Estate of Romancik, 281 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tex. App. 2008).
25 Id.; see also Foy v. Foy (In re Estate of Foy), G044837, 2012 WL 3127333, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 2, 2012) (“The basic test of testamentary intent is not the testator’s realization that he was making
a will, but whether he intended by the particular instrument offered for probate to create a revocable
disposition of his property to take effect only upon his death.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hinson v. Hinson, 280 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1955) (“The animus testandi does not depend upon the
maker’s realization that he is making a will, or upon his designation of the instrument as a will, but upon
his intention to create a revocable disposition of his property to take effect after his death.”); Lindgren,
supra note 9, at 1017 (explaining that “[a]t . . . times, the doctrine is described so narrowly that, unless
the testator intended to fall within the legal category called will, he wouldn’t meet the requirement” and
suggesting that this characterization of testamentary intent is inappropriate).
26 Gillen v. Dotta (In re Dotta’s Estate), 64 P.2d 741, 742 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
27 Snide v. Johnson (In re Snide), 418 N.E.2d 656, 657 (N.Y. 1981) (citations omitted); see also
In re Nadal’s Will, 2 Haw. 400, 405 (1861) (“[W]hile the law has not made it requisite that a will should
assume any particular form, or be couched in language technically appropriate, it should disclose the
real intention of the maker respecting the posthumous destination of his property.”).
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Court of Appeals centered its understanding of testamentary intent on the
estate plan that is expressed through the document’s terms.28
While the courts in California and New York appear to define testamentary intent differently, others seem to include both courts’ understandings of testamentary intent in their explanations of the requirement. As previously discussed, Justice Carr of the Supreme Court of Virginia eloquently
explains the importance of testamentary intent: “Intention being the life and
soul of a will, it can hardly be imagined, I presume, that a man can make a
will without intending to do so, or give by it more than he means to give.”29
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explains that the validity of a
will presents two questions: “(1) Is this a will? That is, was it intended to be
a disposition of property to take effect after death? (2) Is it sufficiently certain and definite as to be capable of intelligent interpretation and enforcement?”30 The court concludes by explaining that “[b]oth questions must be
answered in the affirmative, else the writing [should not be] admitted to
probate as a will.”31 Thus, the courts of last resort of Pennsylvania and Virginia seem to include both the intent that a specific document operate as a
will and the intent that specific testamentary gifts be expressed through the
terms of the document in their articulations of the testamentary intent requirement.
Thus, while it is clear that “[t]o be a will, a document must be executed with testamentary intent,”32 what this requirement entails is far from certain. Various articulations of the testamentary intent requirement are strewn
throughout the case law dealing with the validity of wills. Indeed, courts
from across jurisdictions often express conflicting understandings of the
requirement, or they provide little explanation as to the requirement’s
meaning. In short, despite that courts universally recognize the importance
of testamentary intent, no well-defined understanding of this fundamental
doctrine has emerged from case law.
B.

Clarity Attempted

Given the centrality of testamentary intent in the law of wills, one
would think that the uncertainty surrounding the doctrine would attract sig28 While the contrast between the California court and the New York court is clear, sometimes a
court’s explanation of testamentary intent is unclear as to whether testamentary intent refers to the
document that is purported to be a will or to the testator’s estate plan that is reflected in the document.
See, e.g., Arndt v. Arndt, 1 Serg. & Rawle 256, 263 (Pa. 1815) (“All the cases that have been, or can be
cited, will be narrowed at last to this simple question [regarding testamentary intent]. Does it appear
from the evidence, that the testator intended the contents of this writing for his last will?”).
29 Boisseau v. Aldridges, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 222, 234 (1834) (emphasis added).
30 In re Gaston’s Estates, 41 A. 529, 529 (Pa. 1898).
31 Id.
32 Lewis v. Lamb, No. 09-06-201 CV, 2007 WL 2002901, at *3 (Tex. App. July 12, 2007).
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nificant scholarly attention. However, legal scholars generally have done
little to explain the contours of the testamentary intent requirement. Typically, they mention testamentary intent in passing,33 or they recount one or
more of the explanations found in case law without providing much additional guidance regarding the specifics of the requirement.34 Two scholars,
however, have endeavored to provide clarity.
The first is Professor James Lindgren, who recognized the need for a
deeper understanding of the testamentary intent requirement over twenty
years ago.35 Lindgren writes:
Unfortunately, testamentary intent is not well understood or defined. Often the requirement is described in such broad terms that it can just as easily apply to a will substitute, such
as a trust. At other times, the doctrine is described so narrowly that, unless the testator intended to fall within the legal category called will, he wouldn’t meet the requirement. Neither
36
extreme is true.

Recognizing that the courts had conflated and intertwined different conceptions of the doctrine and hoping to provide clarity, Lindgren attempted to
untangle the various strands of testamentary intent.37
In particular, Lindgren identifies eight “subcategories of testamentary
intent.”38 His first subcategory is channeling intent, which he describes as
the “[i]ntent that a document fit into the legal category called ‘will.’”39 As
previously discussed, this subcategory is identifiable in case law in which
courts sometimes explain that the decedent must intend “the document to be
33 See, e.g., Wayne M. Gazur, Coming to Terms with the Uniform Probate Code’s Reformation of
Wills, 64 S.C. L. REV. 403, 413 (2012) (“Extrinsic evidence can be introduced to prove testamentary
intent . . . .”); Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315,
1343 (2011) (“Although courts, especially probate courts, are accustomed to ascertaining testamentary
intent, they are not well-practiced in investigating subjective motivations.”); Karen J. Sneddon, The Will
as Personal Narrative, 20 ELDER L.J. 355, 389 (2013) [hereinafter Sneddon, Will as Personal Narrative] (“With the declaration of the document as a will, the overture also evidences testamentary intent.”).
34 See, e.g., Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The
Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 119 (2008) (“Testamentary intent requires
that the testator intend the will to be the final disposition of the testator’s real or personal property upon
his or her death.”); Frederic S. Schwartz, Models of the Will and Negative Disinheritance, 48 MERCER
L. REV. 1137, 1142-43 (1997) (“[A] will is an expression of the testator’s desires regarding ownership
of her property after death. This is not quite complete, however. We would not wish to give effect to
such an expression unless the testator intended that we do so. The courts have put this in terms of a
requirement of testamentary intent . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35 See Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1016-20.
36 Id. at 1017.
37 See id. at 1016-20.
38 Id. at 1017.
39 Id. (adding that “[d]ocuments have been admitted to probate where the testator has not intended
that the document fit into the legal category called a will” and that “[t]his kind of intent is neither necessary nor sufficient”).
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his or her last will and testament.”40 Related to channeling intent, Lindgren’s second subcategory is probative intent.41 He explains that this is
“[i]ntent that isn’t limited to passing nonprobate assets.”42 Put more clearly,
probative intent is the intent to dispose of property through the probate process.43 Although Lindgren distinguishes channeling intent and probative
intent, they are interconnected. By definition, a will disposes of probate
assets.44 Therefore, if a decedent intends a document to be a will, that is if a
decedent possesses channeling intent, she necessarily also possesses probative intent.
Mirroring the connection between channeling intent and probative intent, Lindgren’s third and fourth subcategories are similarly related. He
explains that the third subcategory of testamentary intent is ambulatory
intent.45 This is the “[i]ntent that a document take effect at death, i.e., that
the document not be immediately effective.”46 Similarly, the fourth subcategory is delayed dispositive intent, which is the “[i]ntent that a document
transfer property at death (that no present interest be conveyed).”47 The
connection between these subcategories is obvious. If a decedent intends a
document to take effect at death, then she necessarily intends no transfer of
property to take place immediately. Thus, if the decedent possesses ambulatory intent, she necessarily possesses delayed dispositive intent. These subcategories of testamentary intent are frequently found in case law that typically couples the two together.48 For example, one Texas Court of Appeals

40 Gularte v. Pradia (In re Estate of Stoker), 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(quoting Di Paulo v. Wittmer (In re Wunderle’s Estate), 181 P.2d 874, 878 (Cal. 1947)); see supra notes
22-25 and accompanying text.
41 See Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017.
42 Id. (“This element is neither necessary nor sufficient.”)
43 See id. (“A letter designed to convey property outside of probate would typically lack probative
intent, as would insurance, a revocable inter vivos trust, and a payable on death account.”). For background on the distinction between the transfer of property within and without the probate system, see
John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1108 (1984).
44 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 41 (9th ed.
2013) (“Probate property is property that passes through probate under the decedent’s will . . . or by
intestacy.”).
45 Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017 (“Ambulatory intent . . . is a necessary condition, at least as to
the provisions that deal with typically testamentary matters.”).
46 Id. (“A letter to an attorney to draft changes in a will would typically lack ambulatory intent
because it is designed to be acted on during life, as would a form setting up a Totten Trust (which would
at least be designed to alter the nominal ownership of a bank account).”).
47 Id. at 1017-18 (“A will usually conveys no present interest, not even the nominal interests or
encumbrances of Totten Trusts. This is not a necessary element, because other purposes besides the
disposition of property are testamentary.”).
48 See sources cited supra note 25.
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explains: “The intent required is to make a revocable disposition of property to take effect after the testator’s death.”49
Lindgren’s fifth and sixth subcategories of testamentary intent are also
related. The fifth, which is labeled executory intent, is the “[i]ntent to execute the document” or, put differently, “[a]n intent to . . . finalize the document.”50 The sixth is nontentative intent.51 Lindgren describes this subcategory as the “[i]ntent that the estate planning scheme not be tentative.”52
Again, the similarities between executory intent and nontentative intent are
apparent. The execution of a will is considered strong evidence of the will’s
finality.53 Thus, if a decedent intends to execute a will, she also intends that
the estate plan expressed in the will be final. Similar to their coupling of
ambulatory intent and delayed dispositive intent, courts frequently reference executory intent and nontentative intent in tandem. For instance, the
Supreme Court of Georgia explains: “The intention of the testator must not
only be final, as to the dispository clauses of the will, but as to the execution also.”54
Finally, like the first three pairs of subcategories, Lindgren’s seventh
and eighth subcategories of testamentary intent are related. He explains that
the seventh subcategory is descriptive testamentary intent, which he describes as “[i]ntent that the document describe an estate plan.”55 The eighth
subcategory is evidentiary intent, which is the “[i]ntent that the document
be used after death as evidence of the estate plan.”56 Thus by descriptive
intent, Lindgren refers to the decedent’s intent that the will describe specific
testamentary gifts, and by evidentiary intent, he refers to the idea that that
the will be a legally effective expression of those gifts. Although Lindgren
isolates evidentiary intent, it is unclear how this subcategory differs from
his previously described nontentative intent subcategory.57 If the decedent’s
intent is nontentative, the decedent would seem to intend that the will be
49

Cason v. Taylor, 51 S.W.3d 397, 405 (Tex. App. 2001).
Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1018 (“Executory intent . . . should be present in all wills.”).
51 Id. (“This condition is necessary, but not sufficient.”).
52 Id.
53 See Langbein, supra note 7, at 495 (“Compliance with the Wills Act formalities for a witnessed
will is meant to conclude the question of testamentary intent.”). For instance, “[t]he signature tends to
show that the instrument was finally adopted by the testator as his will and to militate against the inference that the writing was merely a preliminary draft, an incomplete disposition, or haphazard scribbling.” Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J.
1, 5 (1941) (footnote omitted).
54 Mealing v. Pace, 14 Ga. 596, 631 (1854); see also Waller v. Waller, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 454, 461
(1845) (“The formalities of the law are writing and signing, and when these are united with final testamentary intent, the instrument is a valid will.”).
55 Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1018 (“Many documents can describe an estate plan, whether put
into force or not. This condition is necessary, but not sufficient.”).
56 Id. (“This element is neither necessary nor sufficient.”).
57 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
50
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used as evidence of her intent. Conversely, if the decedent intends the will
to have evidentiary import, her intent would necessarily be nontentative.
Although Lindgren’s framework makes progress toward clarifying the
testamentary intent requirement, it does not resolve all the doctrine’s uncertainty. In fact, it perhaps raises more questions than it answers. For instance, it is unclear why the previously discussed distinctions between related subcategories are significant.58 Moreover, Lindgren’s identification of
the eight subcategories of testamentary intent does little to guide courts in
their task of determining whether the testamentary intent requirement has
been satisfied. He explains: “The typical will has all eight and having all
eight is sufficient to establish testamentary intent. Lacking one or more
attributes may lead to an absence of testamentary intent, or it may not.”59
This explanation provides courts no direction in applying the testamentary
intent doctrine. While Lindgren makes a noble attempt at clarity, he himself
later acknowledged its shortcomings. In fact, he characterizes the framework as “a fumbling attempt to disentangle” the meaning of testamentary
intent.60 Even Lindgren therefore recognizes that, while his framework represents progress toward a better understanding of testamentary intent, more
work is needed.
Picking up where Lindgren left off, Professor Katheleen Guzman also
sought to clarify testamentary intent.61 Like Lindgren, Guzman recognizes
the uncertainly surrounding the doctrine and describes testamentary intent
as “a piece of tricky business,” “an extraordinarily elusive concept,” and a
“clumsy” doctrine.62 Also like Lindgren, Guzman attempts to give the unwieldy testamentary intent requirement meaningful structure. Whereas
Lindgren divides the concept into eight subcategories, Guzman identifies
testamentary intent’s “discrete but overlapping primary and secondary functions.”63
She explains that testamentary intent’s primary function “drive[s] the
original finding of the will.”64 Elsewhere, she describes this primary function as “The Constitutive Properties of Testamentary Intent.”65 Thus, within
Guzman’s framework, testamentary intent’s major function is to differentiate a will from a non-testamentary document. Put differently, testamentary

58

See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017.
60 DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 18, at 264.
61 See generally Guzman, supra note 9.
62 Id. at 306, 308 (“Although assorted indicators guide presumption and assessment over whether
any basic ‘intent’ exists within a particular context, both the term and the thoughts it describes are
inalterably subjective.”).
63 Id. at 310.
64 Id.
65 Id.
59
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intent refers to the intent that a particular document constitute a will.66
Within her discussion of this function, Guzman focuses exclusively on the
law of will-execution.67 If the decedent executed the document in compliance with the prescribed formalities, the law presumes she intended the
document to be a will.68 Conversely, if the decedent did not comply with the
prescribed formalities, the law presumes that she did not intend the document to be a will.69 Therefore, within Guzman’s understanding, testamentary intent’s principal role is to differentiate a document that the decedent
intended to constitute a will from a document that she did not.
The secondary function of testamentary intent that Guzman identifies
relates to a will’s meaning.70 She writes, “Upon the establishment of a will .
. . , intent remains key but takes a slightly different thrust. No longer employed to assess whether the decedent intended the subject document to be
a will, it now illuminates its meaning with principals of interpretation and
construction.”71 When the court interprets a will, its objective is to fulfill the
actual intent of the testator regarding the disposition of her property.72 Relatedly, when the testator’s actual intent is elusive, the court will apply rules
of construction that are aimed at fulfilling the testator’s probable intent.73
Thus, regardless of whether the decedent’s actual intent is identifiable or
must be approximated through doctrines aimed at discerning the decedent’s
66

See id. at 310-12 (“[A] proffered document generally requires two components to qualify as a
will: testamentary intent and formalities.”).
67 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 310-19 (“Intent and formalities, each critical, have . . . often
worked in tandem. One may exist, or the other; both, or neither. Casting them in counterpoise, as is
often done, suggests that each component has always held equal weight in assessing a document for
probate. In reality, intent usually surrendered to formalities, an imbalance apparent in the asymmetry of
some of this doctrine and, if listening hard, even in the language of the cases themselves.”).
68 See Langbein, supra note 7, at 514-15; J. G. Miller, Substantial Compliance and the Execution
of Wills, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 559, 564-65 (1987); see also John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 521, 541-43 (1982).
69 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 171; Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary
Capacity of Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69, 100 (2014).
70 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 320-22.
71 Id. at 320.
72 See Pihlajamaa v. Kaihlan (In re Estate of Kaila), 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 872 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (quoting Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank, 926 P.2d 969, 973 (Cal. 1996)) (summarizing “the rules
that generally apply in discerning testamentary intent” and explaining that “[t]he paramount rule in the
construction of wills, to which all other rules must yield, is that a will is to be construed according to the
intention of the testator as expressed therein, and this intention must be given effect as far as possible”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ware v. Minot, 88 N.E. 1091, 1091 (Mass. 1909) (“[O]rdinary
canons for the interpretation of wills, having been established only as aids for determining testamentary
intent, are to be followed only so far as they accomplish that purpose, and not when the result would be
to defeat it.”).
73 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 563 (“For cases in which the testator’s actual
intent is not evident, these rules [of construction] are designed to implement the probable intent of the
typical testator.”).
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probable intent, the law’s guidepost is testamentary intent.74 This role in the
construction and interpretation of wills is what Guzman labels testamentary
intent’s secondary function.75
Like Lindgren’s attempt at clarity, Guzman’s identification of testamentary intent’s primary and secondary functions represents a step toward a
more developed understanding of the testamentary intent doctrine. However, also like Lindgren’s framework, Guzman’s does not resolve all of the
doctrine’s uncertainty. For example, the distinction between her primary
and secondary functions of testamentary intent appears to be the determination of what constitutes a will and the determination of what a will means.76
But Guzman discusses a variety of rules and doctrines within her discussion
of the secondary function that are more related to testamentary intent’s primary function. For example, she includes testamentary intent’s role in willrevocation within its secondary function.77 However, will-revocation, like
will-execution, relates to the determination of what constitutes a will. In the
context of will-execution, the court’s task is to identify the presence of testamentary intent.78 Conversely, in the context of will-revocation, the court’s
task is to identify the absence of testamentary intent.79 In either context,
testamentary intent refers to the intent that the document constitute a will.
Similarly, Guzman includes within her secondary function of testamentary intent various doctrines that deal with the issue of which documents constitute part of a will, including, for example, the doctrine of integration.80 This doctrine holds that “a will initially comprises any pages actually present at execution and intended to be part of it.”81 Therefore, she
explains that under the doctrine of integration, “[t]wo intents are . . . required: testamentary and ‘integrative.’”82 However, the distinction between

74

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document
[including a will] is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent
allowed by law.”); see also In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“The
history of the construction of wills . . . has been shaped by two overriding rules. . . . [One of these rules
is that] the court is to effectuate the testator’s intent.”); In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2002) (“Of course, the paramount objective in interpreting a will is to determine the
intention of the testator . . . .”).
75 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 320-22.
76 See id. at 310. Compare supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text, with supra notes 70-75 and
accompanying text.
77 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 322.
78 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
80 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 319-20 (discussing also the doctrines of incorporation by reference and acts of independent legal significance).
81 Id. at 319; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.5
(AM. LAW INST. 1999).
82 Guzman, supra note 9, at 319.
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testamentary intent and integrative intent is unclear.83 If testamentary intent’s primary function relates to whether the decedent intended a particular
document to constitute a legally effective will,84 the doctrine of integration
would seem to simply extend that function across multiple documents.85 In
other words, a testator can intend a single document to constitute a legally
effective will, or, under the doctrine of integration, the decedent can possess
that same intent with respect to a group of documents. In either situation,
testamentary intent’s function would seem to be to distinguish a will from a
non-testamentary document (or group of documents). Thus, while Guzman
attempts to clarify the testamentary intent doctrine, her framework leaves
room for further refinement.
In sum, both Lindgren and Guzman recognize the need for clarity regarding the contours of testamentary intent. Although they approach the
issue in different ways, both try to unravel various strands of testamentary
intent so that the doctrine’s role in the law of wills is better understood.
Their frameworks, however, do not resolve all of the uncertainty surrounding testamentary intent, and as such, the need for a deeper understanding of
the doctrine remains.
II.

THE TAXONOMY

As seen in Part I, confusion regarding the contours of testamentary intent persists. And as will be seen in Part III, this confusion is the origin of
both doctrinal misapplication and theoretical misunderstanding within the
law of wills. In response to this confusion, Lindgren suggested over twenty
years ago that “it may help to develop a more coherent body of law if we
had more precise terminology for the different strands of testamentary intent that might be present in a will.”86 Yet despite the long-standing need for
clarity and its attendant benefits, no clear understanding has materialized.
As such, this Part heeds Lindgren’s suggestion and develops a taxonomy of
83 Id. at 320 (“Each doctrine involves second-level intent inquires but also, in varying degrees,
inquiry into whether original testamentary intent exists at all. The number, existence, and source of
documents or act to be effectuated within probate are irrelevant without a purported will—something
must anchor testamentary intent to any candidate for integration or incorporation.”).
84 See id. at 310-19; see also supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
85 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.5 note 1
(AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“Occasionally, a court suggests that either relation of sense or physical attachment is essential to integration, but the actual decisions tend strongly to support the view that any evidence will suffice so long as the court is satisfied that at the time of execution the separate papers were
present and regarded by the testator as parts of the will he or she was making.” (citation omitted)).
86 Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017; see Guzman, supra note 9, at 308 (“[M]ore precise tools construct more precise things and usually at a lower eventual cost. More importantly, they permit users to
bring design to fruition and intent to purpose far more reliably than cumbersome instruments allow.
[Thus,] [a] deepened understanding of testamentary intent has always been worth the effort.”).
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testamentary intent in hopes that from it “[a] more coherent body of law
might emerge.”87
A.

Donative Testamentary Intent

The first strand of testamentary intent is donative testamentary intent.
This strand is perhaps the most fundamental, and courts and scholars frequently reference this strand when they discuss testamentary intent. In essence, the issue underlying donative testamentary intent is whether the purported will expresses an intent to make gifts that become effective upon the
decedent’s death.88 As the Supreme Court of Kentucky explains: “An expression of testamentary intent has been uniformly held to require 1) a disposing of property 2) which takes effect after death.”89 Lindgren labels this
strand “ambulatory intent” or “delayed dispositive intent,”90 and although
Guzman does not specifically recognize donative testamentary intent, it is
likely part of what she calls the primary function of testamentary intent.91
This strand of testamentary intent may seem straightforward, as the principal function of a will is to pass property upon death.92 However, the court’s
task of deciding whether a document expresses donative testamentary intent
is not always easy.
When an estate-planning lawyer prepares a will, donative testamentary
intent is rarely an issue.93 In such situations, the document invariably is captioned as the decedent’s “Last Will and Testament”94 and begins with an
87

DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 18, at 264.
See Mitchell v. Donohue, 34 P. 614, 615 (Cal. 1893) (“No particular words are necessary to
show a testamentary intent. It must appear only that the maker intended by it to dispose of property after
his death . . . .”); McKay v. Kimble (In re Estate of Kimble), 871 P.2d 22, 25 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)
(“Testamentary intent . . . focuses on whether the testator intended the instrument to effect a disposition
of property at the time of death.”); Irvin v. Smith, 497 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (“To
have testamentary intention, testator must have intended by the particular instrument to make a revocable disposition of property to take effect on his death.”).
89 Mallory v. Mallory, 862 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Ky. 1993).
90 See Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017-18; see also supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
91 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 310-19; see also supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
92 See Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, 189 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Ark. 2004) (“A will is a disposition of property to take effect upon the death of the maker of the instrument.”); Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An Argument for Revival, 41
CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 166 (2008) (“Wills remain the archetypal vehicle for effecting gratuitous
transfers of property interests at death.”).
93 See Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against Holographic Wills, 74
TENN. L. REV. 93, 110 (2006) (“The testamentary intent requirement is usually not an issue with formal,
attested wills.”).
94 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 311 n.18; Karen J. Sneddon, In the Name of God, Amen: Language in Last Wills and Testaments, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 665, 694 (2011) (“The first characteristic of
the genre of wills is the lyrical title ‘Last Will and Testament.’ The title of the document conveys the
‘animus testandi,’ the testamentary intention.”).
88
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introduction that identifies the testator and the testamentary nature of the
document.95 Moreover, a good lawyer ensures that the language of the will
clearly articulates an intent to make gifts that take effect upon the decedent’s death.96 As such, the probate court seldom must wonder whether a
formal document that is prepared by an attorney expresses donative testamentary intent.97 Nonetheless, professionals do not draft all wills, and donative testamentary intent is therefore not always clear.
Donative testamentary intent is most frequently an issue with holographic wills,98 which are informal wills that are typically drafted by laymen without the aid of an attorney.99 As Professor Richard Lewis Brown
explains: “[H]olographic wills invite suspicion as to the existence of testamentary intent [because they] are often informal documents, such as letters
or memoranda, which lack any formal designation as a will or last testament.”100 In addition to lacking an explicit designation as a will, holographs
95 See Sneddon, Will as Personal Narrative, supra note 33, at 389 (“With the declaration of the
document as a will, the overture . . . evidences testamentary intent.”).
96 See Brown, supra note 93, at 110 (“The formal language of the instrument makes clear that the
instrument is intended to dispose of the testator’s property, and that it is intended to take effect on the
testator’s death.”).
97 See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 541-42 (“Testamentary intent is ordinarily inferred without difficulty from the contents of a will. When the document is captioned ‘Last Will and
Testament’ and purports to dispose of the estate, there is seldom any objection that it lacks testamentary
intent.”).
98 See Gail Boreman Bird, Sleight of Handwriting: The Holographic Will in California, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 605, 610 (1981); Brown, supra note 93, at 110-11; Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey,
Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 170 n.65 (1988).
Issues relating to donative testamentary intent do not arise solely with informal documents. Langbein
and Waggoner explain: “Even the formalities for attested wills are common enough to other types of
legal documents, and instruments that have nothing to do with testation could be said to comply with the
Wills Act. It is the requirement of testamentary intent that prevents such things from qualifying as
wills.” Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 541.
99 See Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118, 1121-22 (La. Ct. App. 1987); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 456, 460 (W. Va. 1982) (“The purpose behind statutory recognition of holographic
wills is to enable those persons who are unable or unwilling to secure the assistance of counsel to make
a valid will in their own handwriting.”); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2010) (“For
persons unable to obtain legal assistance, the holographic will may be adequate.”); Stephen Clowney, In
Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 27, 30 (2008) (“Without hiring a lawyer or involving witnesses, testators in some jurisdictions
easily can put pen to paper, secure in the knowledge that the law must honor their final wishes.”). For an
overview of holographic wills, see DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 197-98.
100 Brown, supra note 93, at 110; see also Boggess v. McGaughey, 207 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Ky.
1948) (“People are prone to write things in letters they never dreamed would be regarded as a will or be
seized upon after death as making the ultimate disposition of their estates.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1073-74 (1996) [hereinafter Hirsch, Inheritance and
Inconsistency] (“Inevitably, courts must contend with nettlesome questions concerning the intent of
authors to render legally effective holographic documents that are offered for probate as wills. (Those
nettles are most prickly when a holograph mixes testamentary declarations with ordinary communication, as when the alleged will appears within a diary or a letter to the alleged beneficiary.)” (footnote

584

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 23:3

sometimes lack cogent drafting that clearly evinces the decedent’s intent to
make gifts that become effective upon death. For instance, Brown suggests
that some “holographic wills may evidence an intention to dispose of property, but fail to make clear when that disposition is to occur”101 and that
“[o]ther holographic documents leave unclear how, or even whether, the
testator intends to dispose of property.”102 Ultimately, Brown concludes that
“[t]he ambiguity of many homemade holographs leaves courts struggling to
determine what the decedent intended.”103
The case of In re Kimmel’s Estate104 illustrates the difficulty that
Brown describes regarding holographic wills.105 In that case, the court had
to determine whether a letter written by Harry Kimmel to his two sons,
George and Irvin, expressed testamentary intent.106 Kimmel’s letter begins
with a discussion of his sons’ method of pickling pork and speculation regarding the harshness of the upcoming winter.107 It then transitions to the
author’s mortality. Kimmel writes: “I have some very valuable papers I
want you to keep fore me so if enny thing hapens all the scock money in the
3 Bank liberty lones Post office stamps and my home on Horner St goes to
George Darl & Irvin.”108 Kimmel concludes by encouraging his sons to
safeguard the letter: “Kepp this letter lock it up it may help you out.”109
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was left to decipher Kimmel’s intent. Was this document simply a letter communicating concerns regarding
Kimmel’s mortality? Or alternatively, did Kimmel intend this document to
express how his property should be distributed upon his death? Put simply,
the court had to determine whether Kimmel intended the document to be an
ordinary letter or to function as a will. Because of the informal nature of the
document, the court’s task of deciding whether Kimmel’s letter evinced
donative testamentary intent was not straightforward. As the court explained: “As is often the case in holographic wills of an informal character,
omitted)). But see Clowney, supra note 99, at 60 (reporting that in a review of probate records for Allegheny County, Pennsylvania “[n]ine times out of ten testators labeled their holographs ‘Last Will &
Testament’ or ‘My Will’”).
101 Brown, supra note 93, at 113.
102 Id. at 115. But see Clowney, supra note 99, at 60 (“Even in cases where the documents submitted for probate lacked a proper label, testators typically employed dispositive language, mentioned
death, and signed and dated their writings.”).
103 Brown, supra note 93, at 116. But see Clowney, supra note 99, at 60 (“The records from Allegheny County demonstrate that the authors of holographic wills clearly and consistently express testamentary intent in their homemade documents.”); Langbein, supra note 7, at 496 (“Not all holographs are
so problematic. The inference of testamentary intent is far stronger when explicit testamentary language
is used.”).
104 123 A. 405 (Pa. 1924).
105 Id. at 406.
106 See id. at 405.
107 Id.
108 Id. (retaining significant mistakes from the original writing).
109 Id.
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much of that which is written is not dispositive; and the difficulty, in ascertaining the writer’s intent, arises largely from the fact that he had little, if
any, knowledge of either law, punctuation, or grammar.”110 Despite the ambiguity caused by these difficulties, the court concluded that Kimmel’s letter expressed an intent to make gifts that became effective upon his death.111
The court reasoned:
It is difficult to understand how the decedent, probably expecting an early demise—as
appears by the letter itself, and the fact of his sickness and inability to work, during the last
three days of the first or second week preceding—could have possibly meant anything else
112
than a testamentary gift . . . .

The issue of donative testamentary intent that arises with purported
holographic wills is not limited to documents prepared by the unsophisticated. For instance, compare In re Kimmel’s Estate with In re Estate of
Kuralt.113 Unlike Kimmel, an uneducated chair maker who died in 1921,114
Kuralt was a Peabody and Emmy Award-winning journalist, who is best
known for his “On the Road” television segments.115 Kuralt died in 1997
leaving behind a formal will that was drafted by an attorney, which named
his wife and their two children as the beneficiaries of his estate.116 Although
this will seemed to dispose of his entire estate, a woman came forward
claiming that Kuralt had executed a holographic will that left her a specific
piece of real property. Unbeknownst to Kuralt’s family, the woman had
been romantically involved with Kuralt for nearly thirty years.117 Roughly
two weeks before he died as a result of complication from lupus and a heart
attack,118 Kuralt wrote his mistress a letter that described his health problems and mentioned the piece of property that the woman claimed Kuralt
wanted her to have.119 Kuralt wrote: “I’ll have the lawyer visit the hospital
to be sure you inherit the rest of the place in [Montana] if it comes to
that.”120
110

In re Kimmel’s Estate, 123 A. at 406.
See id.
112 Id.
113 15 P.3d 931 (Mont. 2000).
114 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 198-99.
115 Joe Sexton, Charles Kuralt, 62, Is Dead; Chronicler of the Country, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/05/arts/charles-kuralt-62-is-dead-chronicler-of-thecountry.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
116 In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d at 932.
117 Id. (“Over the nearly 30-year course of their relationship, Kuralt and Shannon saw each other
regularly and maintained contact by phone and mail. Kuralt was the primary source of financial support
for Shannon and established close, personal relationships with Shannon’s three children.”).
118 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 209.
119 In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d at 933.
120 Id.
111
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The court was left to discern whether by this letter Kuralt expressed
intent to make a gift of the property to his mistress that became effective
upon his death.121 Of course, one could argue that Kuralt intended the letter
to express donative testamentary intent, and indeed his mistress argued just
that.122 However, this interpretation of the letter is far from certain, as the
informal nature of the letter suggests that Kuralt did not intend the letter to
express testamentary gifts.123 Instead, the letter could be seen as simply expressing Kuralt’s wish that his mistress receive the property and describing
how he intended to carry out that intent, namely by having a lawyer draft a
formal will.124 Under this reading of the letter, Kuralt’s actions at best suggest a lack of initiative brought about by the thought that he would have
more time to get things in order. At worst, the language of the document
and Kuralt’s failure to subsequently prepare a formal will suggests an attempt to deceive his mistress.
Regardless of whether Kuralt’s actions reflect lackadaisicalness or deceit, his failure to execute a formal will suggests that the letter did not express an intent to make a gift of the Montana property that was to become
effective upon his death. Put differently, it is unclear whether Kuralt’s letter
expressed donative testamentary intent. Thus, both Kuralt’s letter to his
mistress and Kimmel’s letter to his sons125 highlight the fundamental importance of donative testamentary intent. If the ultimate goal of the law of
wills is to distribute the decedent’s estate according to the decedent’s intent,126 the courts must first decide whether a purported will describes gifts
that are to become effective upon the decedent’s death. If a purported will
does not express intent to make testamentary gifts, the court should not
validate the will because the decedent did not intend the document to operate as a will.
In addition to the distinction between formal wills and holographic
wills, the distinction between the intent that the document be a will and the
intent that the document function as a will is important to understanding
121

Id. at 933-34.
Id.
123 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 214 (“[T]here was much evidence that Kuralt
intended to give Shannon his Montana property, but there was little evidence that he intended the 1997
letter itself to be a will.”); Samuel Flaks, Excusing Harmless Error in Will Execution: The Israeli Experience, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 27, 52 (2010) (“In Kuralt there was convincing evidence
that the testator wanted his girlfriend to inherit the property. Still, the testator likely did not intend the
proffered document, a letter, to be a will.” (footnote omitted)).
124 See Brown, supra note 93, at 113 (describing Kuralt’s language as “indicat[ing] nothing more
than an intention to take future action—consulting a lawyer about the creation of a will . . .”).
125 In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d at 933; In re Kimmel’s Estate, 123 A. 405, 405 (Pa. 1924).
126 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2003); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 650-51 (2014); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals
Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 885 (2013).
122
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donative testamentary intent. In neither Kimmel nor Kuralt did the court
consider whether the decedent intended the document to fit within the legal
category of a will.127 Instead, each court considered whether the document
expressed intent to make testamentary gifts regardless of whether the decedent understood that a will is the appropriate document in which to express
such gifts.128 This approach makes intuitive sense, as there is no obvious
reason to deny those who are ignorant of the appropriate legal document for
passing property upon death the ability to exercise testamentary freedom.
Because the decedent need not intend a will to fall within the legal category of a will,129 a variety of documents could constitute wills. The letters
at issue in both Kimmel and Kuralt illustrate this point, but the potential
informal documents that could operate as wills are not limited letters. As
the court in Kimmel explains, “Deeds, mortgages, letters, powers of attorney, agreements, checks, notes, etc., have all been held to be, in legal effect,
wills.”130 Thus, donative testamentary intent specifically, and therefore the
testamentary intent requirement generally, does not require the decedent to
intend the document to be a will in name but instead requires the decedent
to intend the document to be a will in character.131
Along with the idea that the decedent need not intend the purported
will to be a will in name, the decedent also need not intend the document to
have the legal consequences of a will other than effectuating gifts at death.
For example, although courts sometimes state that the decedent must intend
the will to be revocable,132 this need not be the case. Revocability is simply
127

See In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d at 933; In re Kimmel’s Estate, 123 A. at 405 (“Is the paper
testamentary in character?”).
128 In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d at 934 (framing the issue as “whether Kuralt intended the letter
of June 18, 1997 to effect a testamentary disposition of the Montana property”); In re Kimmel’s Estate,
123 A. at 405-06 (posing the question: “Is the paper testamentary in character?”).
129 See Smith v. Smith, 232 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949) (“Testamentary intent does not
depend necessarily upon the testator’s understanding that in executing the particular paper he was making a will. If he manifests a clear intention to dispose of his property after his decease . . . , it is immaterial what he thought the instrument was which he executed.”).
130 In re Kimmel’s Estate, 123 A. at 405 (quoting court below—Orphans’ Court of Cambria County, Reed, J., presiding) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“While the informal character of a paper is an
element in determining whether or not it was intended to be testamentary, this becomes a matter of no
moment when it appears thereby that the decedent’s purpose was to make a posthumous gift.” (citation
omitted)); see In re Will of Belcher, 66 N.C. 51, 54 (1872).
131 Lindgren included the intent that the document be a will, which he labels channeling intent, in
his framework of testamentary intent. Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017. He acknowledges that this type
of intent is not necessary for a valid will. Id. But by including this channeling intent within his framework, he may add confusion to the general testamentary intent requirement.
132 E.g., Nasland v. Nasland, D055777, 2012 WL 1860050, at *22 (Cal. Ct. App. May 22, 2012)
(“‘It [testamentary intent] means the testator’s general intent to make a revocable disposition of his or
her property, effective on the testator’s death.’” (quoting Smith v. Smith (In re Estate of Smith), 71 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 424, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998))); In re Estate of Barton, No. 10-08-00372-CV, 2009 WL
5155571, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 30, 2009) (“A document is not a will unless it is executed with testa-
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a consequence of the decedent’s intent that the document operate as a
will.133 If a decedent intends to make gifts that take effect upon death, the
gifts are inherently revocable, but the decedent need not be specifically
aware of the revocable nature of the gifts in order for the purported will to
reflect donative testamentary intent.
Another legal consequence of a will that is not properly understood as
a component of testamentary intent is found in Lindgren’s framework. As
previously discussed, Lindgren identifies probative intent as a strand of
testamentary intent, which he describes as the intent to pass property
through the probate process.134 Assets that are distributed through a will
necessarily pass through the probate system.135 But because the decedent
need not intend the purported will to fit within the legal category of a will,
the decedent also need not intend that her estate pass through probate. Of
course, a decedent could intend probate distribution, but such intent is not
necessary. Therefore, Lindgren’s probative intent, like the intent that a purported will be revocable, is not a component of testamentary intent. Instead,
revocability and probate distribution are merely legal consequences of the
decedent’s testamentary intent.
In sum, donative testamentary intent is the first strand of testamentary
intent that courts should consider when deciding whether a purported will
satisfies the general testamentary intent requirement. This type of intent
refers to whether the purported will expresses an intent to make a gift that
becomes effective upon the decedent’s death.136 Although it is rarely an
issue with formal wills that are prepared by professional estate planning
attorneys, donative testamentary intent can be uncertain when laymen draft
informal documents that are not explicitly identified as a will and that are
not clearly drafted.137
B.

Operative Testamentary Intent

The second strand of testamentary intent is operative testamentary intent. Unlike donative testamentary intent, which is concerned with whether

mentary intent. The intent required is to make a revocable disposition of property to take effect after the
testator’s death.” (citations omitted)).
133 Loy v. Shepherd (In re Estate of Shepherd), 130 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (“A
will by nature is ambulatory; thus a will possesses the inherent quality of revocability. It has been said
that an instrument which is irrevocable cannot be a will, whatever else it may be.”); Klein, supra note
12, at 487 (“Wills are inherently revocable. A will does not take effect until the testator dies with the
will unrevoked.” (footnote omitted)).
134 See Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017; see also supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
135 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 41.
136 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
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a particular document expresses an intent to convey property upon death,138
operative testamentary intent is concerned with whether the decedent intended a document that expresses donative testamentary intent to be legally
effective. As one California Court of Appeals explains: “[F]or a document
to be the last will of a deceased person, it must appear therefrom that the
decedent intended by the very paper itself to make a disposition of his property in favor of the party claiming thereunder.”139 Thus, once the court decides that a purported will surpasses the threshold requirement of describing
testamentary gifts, it must decide whether the decedent specifically intended the document to be a legally effective expression of those gifts.140
Just as donative testamentary intent can be difficult to discern,141 the
identification of operative testamentary intent can also be problematic. Although a purported will may clearly describe testamentary gifts, such an
expression of donative testamentary intent may be tentative or incomplete.
For instance, a decedent typically takes notes and prepares rough drafts
before preparing the document that she intends to be the definitive expression of her desired estate plan.142 Because the decedent is inevitably dead at
the time of probate, the court’s task of deciding whether a purported will
represents the final expression of the decedent’s testamentary intent could
prove challenging.143 Indeed, the court cannot simply ask the decedent
whether she intended a document to be a legally effective expression of her
desired estate plan or merely a rough draft of a potential will.
138
139

See supra Section II.A.
Gillen v. Dotta (In re Dotta’s Estate), 64 P.2d 741, 742 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937) (emphasis

added).
140 See Van Giesen v. White, 30 A. 331, 332 (N.J. Ch. 1894) (“[T]estamentary intent is the purpose
to render effective the testator’s preference or desire, and consists of something more than the mere
desire. The testator’s preference . . . is not alone sufficient to give direction to the property. It must be
supported by the appearance of a purpose that the preference shall have effect.”); Stein’s Lessee v.
North, 3 Yeates 324, 325 (Pa. 1802) (per curiam) (“There must be an advised purpose to make a present
disposition of the party’s estate. Here it is but the signification of an intention to do a future act, and so
not the testament itself, which must contain a present and perfect consent.”).
141 See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
142 See Case of Barnet’s Appeal, 3 Rawle 15, 15 (Pa. 1831) (“Though a rough draft may be a
testament, where the intent is clearly apparent, yet it is otherwise if it appear that the decedent viewed it
as a mere outline to be filled up and completed by more detailed provisions . . . .”); Hirsch, Inheritance
and Inconsistency, supra note 100, at 1065 (“[M]any persons are given to speak and write off the cuff,
many persons commit to words tentative drafts of their wills and then have second thoughts when the
time for inking draws near.”); Langbein, supra note 7, at 494-95 (“[T]he danger exists that [the decedent] may make seeming testamentary dispositions . . . without . . . finality of intention. Not every
expression that ‘I want you to have the house when I’m gone’ is meant as a will.”). For an example of a
contemporary court addressing this issue, see In re Estate of Gonzalez, 855 A.2d 1146, 1148-49 (Me.
2004) (deciding whether a decedent intended a preprinted will form to constitute a legally effective will
when there was evidence that suggested the decedent intended the form to be a rough draft that he would
redraft on another form).
143 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 53, at 6-7.
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To alleviate these evidentiary difficulties, the law prescribes the method by which the decedent can clearly communicate operative testamentary
intent to the probate court.144 Specifically, the law of wills requires that the
decedent comply with a variety of formalities in order to execute a legally
effective will. These formalities include the requirements that the will be
written, signed by the decedent, and attested by two witnesses.145 The decedent’s compliance with these formalities provides robust evidence that the
decedent intended the document to constitute a legally effective expression
of testamentary intent.146 As one leading casebook explains, “A competent
person . . . is unlikely to execute an instrument in strict compliance with all
of the Wills Act formalities unless the person intends the instrument to be
his will.”147 Guzman similarly explains that “[f]ew people would undergo
[the] ceremony [of will-execution] without holding testamentary intent.”148
Thus, when the decedent complies with the formalities of will-execution,
the court presumes that the document reflects the decedent’s operative testamentary intent.149
Although a decedent likely intended a formally compliant document to
constitute a legally effective will, and the law therefore presumes that such
a document reflects operative testamentary intent, not all formally compliant documents are intended to be legally effective wills.150 For example,
there is small body of case law addressing purported wills of members of
the Masonic Order that illustrates the role of operative testamentary intent.151 In these cases, Freemasonry candidates were obligated to execute
wills as part of their initiation rite,152 and although the purported wills strictly complied with the formalities of will-execution and clearly described

144

See Langbein, supra note 7, at 492-93.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 153; Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal
Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 42325 (2009).
146 See Porche v. Mouch (Succession of Porche), 288 So. 2d 27, 30 (La. 1973) (“The minimal
formal requirements of the statutory will are only designed to provide a simplified means for a testator
to express his testamentary intent and to assure, through his signification and his signing in the presence
of a notary and two witnesses, that the instrument was intended to be his last will.”); Mark Glover,
Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 342-43 (2016).
147 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 153.
148 Guzman, supra note 9, at 311 n.18.
149 See Langbein, supra note 7, at 513.
150 Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 541-43.
151 See id. at 542 n.75.
152 Vickery v. Vickery, 170 So. 745, 745 (Fla. 1936) (“One of the qualifications for membership in
Scottish Rite Masonry is that every candidate, prior to his being taken into the order, is required to
execute his last will and testament, in the event he has not already prior thereto duly made his will.”); In
re Watkins’ Estate, 198 P. 721, 721 (Wash. 1921) (“It was testified by members of the order that the
making of a will was a part of the ceremony of the particular degree, required of all candidates who had
not theretofore made a will.”).
145
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testamentary gifts,153 the courts had to decide whether the decedents intended the documents to be legally effective wills or to be merely ceremonial
documents that satisfied the Masonic initiation requirements.154 These decisions were not straightforward, as evidence was presented that suggested
the decedents executed the wills solely to complete their initiation and
therefore did not intend the wills to be legally effective expressions of testamentary intent.155 The Supreme Court of Virginia nicely summarizes the
issue that arises in these and similar cases when it writes: “[O]ne may execute a paper with every formality known to the law, and by it devise all of
his property, but, unless he intends that very paper to take effect as a will, it
is no will.”156 Thus, even if donative testamentary intent is clear, the validity

153

See, e.g., Shiels v. Shiels, 109 S.W.2d 1112, 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (quoting the decedent’s writing: “It is my will that all my property both real and personal should become the property of
my mother, Charlott Jane Shiels.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Watkins’ Estate, 198 P. at
721 (quoting the language of the purported will: “I wish my property, whatever it may be, divided into
five parts and my youngest daughter to receive two parts, and the other to the other three children.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
154 See, e.g., Vickery, 170 So. at 746 (explaining that a will “should be presumed to have been
made with testamentary intent when appearing to have been executed with required legal formalities”
but when “uncertainty and doubt is . . . shown to have surrounded the supposed making and execution of
the alleged will” the probate judge can “refus[e] to allow such doubtful will to probate as the testamentary act of the alleged testator . . .”); Shiels, 109 S.W.2d at 1113 (“Testamentary intent on the part of the
maker is essential to constitute an instrument a will, regardless of its correctness in form. And the issue
of such intention is not limited to the language of the instrument alone. The facts and circumstances
surrounding its execution may be looked to in determining whether the maker intended it to be a testamentary disposition of his property or merely to be used for some other purpose.”).
155 Shiels, 109 S.W.2d at 1113 (describing that the decedent “protested and said that he did not
want to make a will, that he did not have anything to make a will for”); In re Watkins’ Estate, 198 P. at
722 (describing the testimony of one witness who testified that the decedent after executing the purported will remarked: “That is quite a josh” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Langbein and Waggoner
label these cases as the “sham wills cases.” Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 541. Sham wills
cases, however, are not limited to the Masonic wills cases. E.g., Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499, 499
(Mass. 1904) (involving a will that was purportedly drafted and executed not with the intent that the
document be legally effective but with the intent to induce the sole beneficiary to engage in a sexual
relationship with the testator).
156 Early v. Arnold, 89 S.E. 900, 901 (Va. 1916) (emphasis added); see also McBride v. McBride,
67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 476, 481 (1875) (“It must satisfactorily appear that he intended the very paper to be
his will. Unless it does so appear, the paper must be rejected, however correct it may be in its form,
however comprehensive in its detail, however conformable to the otherwise declared intentions of the
party, and although it may have been signed by him with all due solemnity.”); In re Watkins’ Estate, 198
P. at 722 (“It is well settled, of course, that an instrument offered for probate as a will, however formal
may have been its execution, will not be admitted to probate as such unless it was executed by the
testator with testamentary intent. If it is executed . . . as a part of a ceremonial, for the purpose of deception, or for the purpose of perpetrating a jest, it is not a will . . . .”); Guzman, supra note 9, at 311 (“A
document bearing all statutory formalities might raise a pragmatic or legal presumption that testamentary intent exists. Nevertheless, establishing its absence will usually prevent a will’s admission to probate or affect its vitality thereafter.” (footnotes omitted)).
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of a purported will requires the court to determine whether the decedent
intended the document to operate as a legally effective will.
The issue of operative testamentary intent intuitively arises in the context of the initial validation of a will, but it also arises in other contexts. For
example, like will-execution, will-revocation requires the court to evaluate
whether the decedent intended a will to be legally effective. Because a will
only becomes effective upon death, the decedent can revoke a will at any
time during life, and the probate court will not recognize it as a legally effective expression of the decedent’s estate plan.157 Thus, in contrast to willexecution, which presents the issue of whether the decedent initially intended a purported will to be legally effective,158 will-revocation raises the issue
of whether the decedent no longer intended a valid will to be legally effective.159 Although will-execution and will-revocation present the probate
court with slightly different issues, both require the court to determine
whether the decedent intended a purported will to be legally effective and
therefore both require the court to decipher the decedent’s operative testamentary intent.160
Neither Lindgren nor Guzman specifically identify operative testamentary intent, but both touch upon the issues raised by this strand of the testamentary intent doctrine. Lindgren, for instance, subdivides operative testa157

See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 215.
See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
159 The Restatement (Third) of Property explains that the testator may revoke her will by two
methods. First, the testator can revoke a will by “executing a subsequent will that expressly revokes the
will or specified part or that revokes the will or part by inconsistency . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1999). Second, the
testator may revoke her will by “performing a revocatory act on the will with the intent to revoke.” Id.
Thus, to revoke a previous will by executing a new will, the testator must possess operative testamentary
intent with respect to the new will and therefore must not possess operative testamentary intent with
respect to the previous will. Similarly, to revoke a will by physical act the testator must possess the
intent to revoke, which is essentially the absence of operative testamentary intent. Just as testamentary
intent is sometimes referred to in its Latin form, animus testandi, revocatory intent is sometimes referred
to as animus revocandi. Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of
“Speech”, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1560 n.138.
160 In addition to will-execution and will-revocation, the issue of operative testamentary intent
arises in other contexts, for instance with the doctrine of revival. “The question of revival typically
arises under the following facts . . . : Testator executes will 1. Subsequently, testator executes will 2,
which revokes will 1 . . . . Later, testator revokes will 2.” DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at
238. The revival doctrine holds that, if the testator intends will 1 to be legally effective after the revocation of will 2, “the previously revoked will 1 is valid without having to be re-executed.” Id.; see also
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-509(a) (amended 2010) (“The previous will is revived if it is evident from the
circumstances of the revocation of the subsequent will or from the testator’s contemporary or subsequent declarations that the testator intended the previous will to take effect as executed.”). Thus, like
will-execution and will-revocation, the revival doctrine focuses on whether the decedent intended a
document to operate as a legally effective will. The doctrines of integration and incorporation by reference, which deal with the question of which documents constitute part of the will, also raise the issue of
operative testamentary intent. See infra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
158
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mentary intent into three subcategories. First, he identifies executory intent,
which he describes as the “[i]ntent to execute the document.”161 Second, he
identifies nontentative intent, which he explains is the “[i]ntent that the estate planning scheme not be tentative or a sham.”162 Finally, he identifies
evidentiary intent, which is the “[i]ntent that the document be used after
death as evidence of the estate plan.”163
Although Lindgren separately recognizes these subcategories, all three
are components of operative testamentary intent, as each focuses on whether the decedent intended the purported will to be legally effective. For instance, if the decedent did not intend to execute a will, she lacked not only
executory intent but also operative testamentary intent. As discussed previously, will-execution is the means by which the decedent communicates
operative testamentary intent to the court.164 Therefore, if the decedent did
not intend to execute the will, she correspondingly did not intend the will to
be legally effective. Likewise, if the testamentary gifts described in the
document were tentative or a sham, the decedent lacked both nontentative
intent and operative testamentary intent. Relatedly, if the decedent did not
intend the document to be used as evidence of her estate plan, she lacked
both evidentiary intent and operative testamentary intent. Put differently,
when the decedent intends a purported will to be a sham, she necessarily
does not intend the document to be used as evidence of her estate plan, and
she consequently does not intend the document to be a legally effective
will. Lindgren, therefore, implicitly recognizes operative testamentary intent as a component of the general testamentary intent doctrine. However,
he adds potentially confusing complexity by unnecessarily dividing this
strand into closely related subcategories.
Like Lindgren, who divides operative testamentary intent into multiple
strands, Guzman improperly separates various rules and doctrines that focus
on operative testamentary intent into different categories. As mentioned
previously, Guzman describes the primary function of testamentary intent
as “driving the original finding of a will,”165 and she focuses her discussion
on the law of will-execution.166 Thus, Guzman’s primary function of testamentary intent raises the issue of operative testamentary intent.167 However,
she relegates other rules and doctrines that focus on operative testamentary
intent to her secondary function of testamentary intent.168 For instance, she
separates will-revocation from will-execution and places it within the sec161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1018.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
Guzman, supra note 9, at 310.
See id. at 310-19; see also supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144-156 and accompanying text.
See Guzman, supra note 9, at 319-22.
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ondary function of testament intent.169 But as previously explained, willexecution and will-revocation both deal with the same question: Did the
decedent intend a purported will to be legally effective?170 Will-execution
focuses on the presence of this intent,171 while will-revocation focuses on
the absence of this intent,172 but both involve the issue of operative testamentary intent.
As she does for will-revocation, Guzman separates the doctrines of integration and incorporation by reference from testamentary intent’s primary
function.173 She does so despite that both focus upon the issue of operative
testamentary intent. The doctrine of integration holds that all papers that
were present at the time of will-execution and that the decedent intended to
be part of the will are legally effective components of the will.174 Similarly,
under the doctrine of incorporation by reference, a document that is not
present at the time of will-execution may be treated as part of the will if the
language of the executed will describes the document and evidences the
decedent’s intent that the document be a legally effective component of the
will.175 Thus both integration and incorporation by reference are closely
related to will-execution, as each focus on the decedent’s intent that certain
documents operate as part of a legally effective will. Guzman herself
acknowledges the relationship between will-execution and these doctrines
when she explains, “In addition to its growing centrality to a will’s creation,
intent figures prominently in a series of loosely grouped doctrines aimed at
discerning the . . . documents that constitute a will.”176 Therefore, despite
Guzman separating the integration and incorporation by reference doctrines
from will-execution, the underlying issue of intent of all three is the decedent’s intent that a particular document be a legally effective expression of
her desired estate plan. Put simply, will-execution, integration, and incorporation by reference all address the issue of the decedent’s operative testamentary intent.
In sum, although donative testamentary intent and operative testamentary intent are closely related, they are properly understood as independent
components of the testamentary intent doctrine. Whereas, the donative
strand of testamentary intent relates to whether a purported will describes
testamentary gifts,177 operative testamentary intent relates to whether the
decedent intended a purported will to be a legally operative expression of
169

Id. at 322.
See supra notes 144-160 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 144-156 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text; see also Guzman, supra note 9, at 322 (“As
with effecting a valid will, revoking one also requires intent, this time revocatory . . . .”).
173 Guzman, supra note 9, at 319-20.
174 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 241.
175 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-510 (amended 2010).
176 Guzman, supra note 9, at 319.
177 See supra Section II.A.
170
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those gifts.178 Before recognizing a document as a will, the probate court
should first determine that the document reflects donative testamentary
intent by describing testamentary gifts and then should evaluate operative
testamentary intent by deciding whether the decedent intended the document to be legally effective.
C.

Substantive Testamentary Intent

The third and final strand of testamentary intent is substantive testamentary intent. Unlike donative testamentary intent and operative testamentary intent, which both focus upon the determination of whether the decedent intended a particular document to be a legally effective will,179 substantive testamentary intent focuses upon the interpretation of the decedent’s
will. The guiding principle in the construction of wills is that courts should
interpret the will in a way that results in the distribution of the estate in the
manner that the decedent intended.180 As the Supreme Court of Mississippi
explains: “The paramount and controlling consideration [of will construction] is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the testator.”181 The
Supreme Court of Virginia similarly explains: “Our purpose of course is to
find the testamentary intent. If a will reflects a clear intent . . . we honor that
intent.”182 Thus, once the court determines both that the purported will expresses testamentary gifts and that the decedent intended the document to
be legally effective, the court must turn to the final element of the testament
intent doctrine and construe the will in accordance with the decedent’s intent.
The court’s primary goal in interpreting a will is to ascertain the actual
intent of the testator, or put differently, to decipher the true meaning of the
testator’s words.183 To determine the decedent’s actual intent, courts tradi178

See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
See supra Sections II.A-B.
180 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-601 cmt. (amended 2010) (“[T]he widely accepted proposition
[is] that a testator’s intention controls the legal effect of his or her dispositions.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The
controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention.
The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”).
181 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson v. First Nat’l Bank of Jackson, 352 So. 2d 1324, 1327
(Miss. 1977).
182 Lane v. Starke, 692 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Va. 2010).
183 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.230 (West 2012) (“All courts and others concerned in the
execution of last wills shall have due regard to the direction of the will, and the true intent and meaning
of the testator, in all matters brought before them.”); In re Earle’s Estate, 85 A.2d 90, 93 (Pa. 1951)
(“[I]t is the actual intent, as ascertained from the language of the will that must prevail in the light of the
circumstances surrounding [the] testator at the date of the execution of the will.”); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
(“The donor’s intention controls the meaning of a donative document to the extent that the donor’s
179
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tionally use the plain meaning rule.184 When applying this rule, courts attribute the plain meaning or typical understanding to the decedent’s words,
and they do not consider extrinsic evidence that suggests a contradictory
interpretation of the will’s language.185 The Supreme Court of Mississippi
explains: “The surest guide to testamentary intent is the wording employed
by the maker of the will.”186 “[I]f the language of the will is clear, definite,
and unambiguous, the court must give to the language its clear import.”187
Although the court’s objective is to ascertain the actual intent of a decedent, such a goal is not always attainable. At times, the language of a will
is ambiguous and as a result the plain meaning of the testator’s words are
inapprehensible.188 Additionally, a considerable amount of time sometimes
intervenes between the execution of a will and the testator’s death, and consequently changed circumstances might suggest that the testator would
want a different disposition of her estate than what the language of her will
reflects.189 In these circumstances, various cannons of construction and presumptions of intent that are aimed at discerning the decedent’s probable
intent guide the court’s task of deciphering the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent.190
intention is sufficiently established. In case of a conflict between the intention of an individual donor
and a rule of construction or a constructional preference, the donor’s intention, when sufficiently established, is controlling.”); Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction
Between Will Interpretation and Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 68-70 (2005).
184 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328; Storrow, supra note 183, at 70-73.
185 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328 (“Under this rule, extrinsic evidence may be
admitted to resolve certain ambiguities, but the plain meaning of the words of a will cannot be disturbed
by evidence that the testator intended another meaning.”); Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man Talking:
Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
811, 814 (2001) (“The plain meaning rule appears simple: courts shall not admit extrinsic evidence to
contradict or add to the planning meaning of the words in a will.”).
186 Tinnin v. First United Bank of Miss., 502 So. 2d 659, 663 (Miss. 1987).
187 Bullard v. Bullard, 97 So. 1, 2 (Miss. 1923); accord In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 818
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he court is to avoid doing any violence to the words employed in the instrument and to distrust the reliability of looking to sources outside the instrument for information about
its meaning . . . .”).
188 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.1 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“This section defines an ambiguity in a donative document as an uncertainty in
meaning that is revealed by the text or by extrinsic evidence other than direct evidence of intention
contradicting the plain meaning of the text. An uncertainty in meaning shows that the document contains
an inadequate expression of the donor’s intention. Ambiguities often but not necessarily arise in situations in which two or more constructions of the document are plausible.”).
189 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 327 (“Another difficulty in construing wills stems
from the gap in time that intervenes between the making of a will and the testator’s death. During this
gap, which may span years or even decades, circumstances can change in a way that renders the will
stale or obsolete.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH.
U. L. REV. 609, 610-13 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Text and Time].
190 In re Estate of Grulke, 546 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (“If a simple reading of the
will, using the words in their ordinary and natural sense, does not unmistakably reveal the maker’s
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For example, when interpreting wills, the courts generally employ a
cannon of construction that resolves ambiguity in favor of testacy over intestacy.191 As the New York Court of Appeals explains: “The idea of anyone deliberately purposing to die testate as to a portion of his estate and
intestate as to another portion is so unusual in the history of testamentary
disposition as to justify almost any construction to escape it.”192 Other canons of construction that courts apply when interpreting wills include the
constructional preferences that favor family members over non-family
members,193 that give the decedent favorable tax consequences,194 and that
presume the decedent’s intent accords with public policy.195 Through the
application of these and other constructional principles, the court attempts
to determine the decedent’s probable intent in situations where her actual
intent is ambiguous.
In addition to the various canons of construction that guide the court in
resolving ambiguity in the language of a will, a variety of rebuttable presumptions aid the court in fulfilling the decedent’s substantive testamentary
intent. But instead of resolving ambiguity caused by the decedent’s words,

intention, the court may resort to certain accredited cannons of construction. These cannons of construction permit us to impute a meaning conforming to the testator’s probable intention and one that is most
agreeable to reason and justice.” (citation omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Rules of construction and constructional preferences assist in resolving many types of ambiguities, but they do not constitute evidence
of the donor’s actual intention. They are devices that attribute intention to individual donors in particular circumstances on the basis of common intention.”); Storrow, supra note 183, at 80-81 (“What is less
well known is what a court must do when even the admission of extrinsic evidence is insufficient to
disclose the testator’s actual intent. At this juncture, the court will resort to will construction, the process
of attributing intention to the words used by the testator with the aid of rules of construction and constructional preferences. By resorting to construction, a court is essentially declaring the testator’s intent
itself to be ambiguous. The application of rules of construction, then, is calculated to endow the conveyance with some legal effect, albeit in favor of imputing an intent as the state identifies it.” (footnotes
omitted)).
191 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3(c)(2)
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (describing the constructional preference for “the construction that favors completeness of disposition”); Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1473 (2013)
(“Courts have created a presumption against intestacy . . . .”).
192 Hayes v. Hayes (In re Hayes’ Will), 188 N.E. 716, 718 (N.Y. 1934) (quoting 2 ISAAC F.
REDFIELD, THE LAW OF WILLS *235 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1876)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); accord In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2002) (“[T]he
testator is presumed to intend to avoid intestacy otherwise he or she would not have bothered to make a
will.”).
193 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3(c)(3)
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (describing the constructional preference for “the construction that favors family
members over non-family members, the construction that favors close family members over more remote family members, and the construction that does not disinherit a line of descent”).
194 See id. § 11.3(c)(4).
195 See id. § 11.3(c)(6).
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these presumptions address ambiguity raised by changed circumstances.196
As mentioned previously, a substantial amount of time can pass between
the execution of a will and the testator’s death, and within this intervening
period circumstances might change in ways that suggest the decedent’s will
no longer reflects her true substantive testamentary intent.197
For example, the testator might execute a will while married that gives
a substantial portion of her estate to her spouse. She then might divorce and
subsequently die without changing her will to reflect this changed circumstance. In this situation, she very likely would not want her ex-spouse to
receive the bulk of her estate, despite that her will unambiguously makes
such a bequest.198 Based upon the likelihood that the testator mistakenly
failed to update her will,199 the law of most states presumes that the testator
would not want her surviving ex-spouse to receive the bequest and therefore renders any gifts to her ex-spouse ineffective.200
A similar presumption applies when the testator executes a will and
subsequently marries. When a testator marries after executing a will that
does not provide for her new spouse, the law presumes that the she would
want her spouse to share in her estate.201 In such situations, the law in most
states provides the surviving spouse a share of the decedent’s estate despite
that her will purports to disinherit her surviving spouse.202 Again, the rationale underlying this presumption is that the testator’s failure to update
her will does not reflect a considered decision regarding testamentary intent
but instead simply reflects inattentiveness.203 In sum, by presuming both
196

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 562-63 (“For cases in which the testator’s actual
intent is not evident, these rules are designed to implement the probable intent of the typical testator.”).
See generally Hirsch, Text and Time, supra note 189.
197 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
198 Coughlin v. Bd. of Admin., 199 Cal. Rptr. 286, 287 (Cal Ct. App. 1984) (“[U]pon undergoing a
fundamental change in family composition such as marriage, divorce or birth of a child, [testators]
would most likely intend to provide for their new family members, and/or revoke prior provisions made
for their ex-spouses.”).
199 Id. at 288 (explaining that testators “often fail to . . . revoke, not out of conscious intent, but
simply from a lack of attentiveness”).
200 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b) (amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“The dissolution of the testator’s marriage is a change in circumstance that presumptively revokes any provision in the testator’s will in favor
or his or her former spouse.”); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 239.
201 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 563 (“The [state] statutes contain default rules that
can be overcome by evidence that the testator deliberately omitted the surviving spouse and did not
mistakenly fail to update the premarital will.”).
202 Id. (“At common law, a premarital will was revoked by the testator’s marriage or marriage
followed by the birth of issue. Although still in force in a few states, this rule has been overridden in
most states by statutes that give a surviving spouse who is omitted from a premarital will an intestate
share, otherwise leaving the premarital will intact.”).
203 See id. (“These statutes correct for the testator’s assumed mistake in neglecting to update a
premarital will . . . .”).
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that the testator would want her spouse to share in her estate and that she
would not want her ex-spouse to take under her will, the law aims to distribute the testator’s estate in the manner that she would prefer. These presumptions, therefore, illustrate how the law attempts to fulfill the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent.
Unlike donative testamentary intent and operative testamentary in204
tent, Lindgren does not include substantive testamentary intent within his
framework.205 He explains that testamentary intent can include both the
“[i]ntent that a document transfer property at death” and the “[i]ntent that
the document describe an estate plan,”206 but he does not mention the intent
to make specific gifts to specific beneficiaries within his discussion of the
testamentary intent doctrine.207 Guzman fills Lindgren’s omission and includes the interpretation and construction of wills within her framework.208
Specifically, she explains that during will interpretation “intent reigns supreme” and that, within this context, testamentary intent is “[n]o longer
employed to assess whether the decedent intended the subject document to
be a will” but is instead used to “illuminate[] [the will’s] meaning with
principals of interpretation and construction.”209 As such, Guzman recognizes the distinction between donative testamentary intent and operative
testamentary intent, which are concerned with whether the decedent intended a document to be a legally effective expression of testamentary gifts,210
and substantive testamentary intent, which is concerned with identifying the
specific gifts that the decedent intended to make.211
III. THE IMPLICATIONS
Without a clear and uniform doctrine, courts have struggled to consistently and predictably decide issues of testamentary intent. As Guzman explains, the lack of a well-defined testamentary intent doctrine “often generates sharply different outcomes in cases with no appreciable difference in
their underlying intent-reflective facets.”212 This unpredictability has its
costs. For instance, it encourages protracted litigation, which not only has
obvious economic costs but also has psychological and emotional costs for
friends and family of the decedent, who must endure this litigation at a time
204

See supra notes 90, 161-164 and accompanying text.
See Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1017-18.
206 Id.
207 See id. at 1016-20.
208 Guzman, supra note 9, at 320-22; see also supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
209 Guzman, supra note 9, at 320. Guzman furthermore labels her secondary function of testamentary intent “The Constructional Properties of Testamentary Intent.” Id. at 319.
210 See supra Sections II.A-B.
211 See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
212 Guzman, supra note 9, at 307.
205
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when they are still grieving the loss of a loved one.213 Going forward, the
unpredictability of probate litigation regarding testamentary intent might
increase as the law moves away from a formalistic approach to the validation, construction, and interpretation of wills and towards an approach that
vests considerably greater discretion in courts to determine testamentary
intent.214 The two primary examples of this shift are the emergence of the
harmless error rule and the development of the reformation doctrine.215
The harmless error rule focuses on the decedent’s operative testamentary intent. Under conventional law, courts simply look at whether the decedent strictly complied with the formalities of will-execution to decide the
issue of operative testamentary intent.216 This approach fosters predictable
outcomes.217 Instead of the court deciding the underlying issue of whether
the decedent intended a will to be legally effective by weighing all available
213

See id. (“Unpredictable outcomes encourage inefficient litigation and impose unnecessary
economic and human costs on parties to it.”); see also Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss”
Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation
Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 255 (2012) (“Inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes . . . lead to inefficiencies in the legal system because it is harder to settle cases that have inconsistent and unpredictable
outcomes, which in turn increases the parties’ and courts’ litigation costs.”). The unpredictability of
probate litigation may also have psychological costs for the testator. See Mark Glover, A Therapeutic
Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 438-43 (2012); Mark
Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 143-47 (2012).
214 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 308 (“A deepened understanding of testamentary intent . . . . is
more critical now than ever given the enhanced role that intent plays in reducing a will’s formalities and
tempering or even excusing documentary defects. Further, new technologies, expanded definitions of
writings and signatures, broader entryways for extrinsic evidence, and ever-proliferating will substitutes
will alter the methods of its expression in ways that may well require enhanced understanding of the
term.” (footnotes omitted)).
215 See John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform Probate
Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 7-10 (2012) (describing the shift from the strict compliance and plain meaning rule to harmless error and reformation);
John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in Wills: The Restatement of Wills
Delivers New Tools (and New Duties) to Probate Lawyers, PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 28, 28-30
[hereinafter Langbein, Curing Execution Errors]. Another example of the shift toward granting courts
greater discretion to determine the decedent’s intent is the change from the identity theory of ademption
to the intent theory of ademption. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 374.
216 See Langbein, supra note 7, at 489; Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform
Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1045-47 (1994); see also supra Section II.B.
217 Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597, 630 (2014)
(“[B]y channeling all valid wills into substantially the same form, the strict compliance requirement
minimizes the court’s discretion in evaluating the genuineness of wills and consequently increases
certainty regarding which wills are valid and which are not.”); see John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 51 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors] (reporting that an
English law reform committee declined to recommend reform of the strict compliance requirement due
to concerns “that by making it less certain whether or not an informally executed will is capable of being
admitted to probate, [a dispensing power] could lead to litigation, expense, and delay” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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evidence, the court must simply decide whether the decedent left behind a
formally compliant will.218 Whereas courts may vary widely in how they
decide the subjective issue of whether a decedent intended a document to be
a legal effective will, courts likely decide the objective issue of formal
compliance more consistently.219
Although the strict compliance requirement is still the predominate
method of deciding the issue of operative testamentary intent, a small block
of states now allows courts to overlook formal defects and to exercise discretion in determining whether a decedent intended a noncompliant document to be a legally effective will.220 In these states, no longer are courts
merely asked to decide the relatively straightforward issue of whether the
decedent strictly complied with the prescribed will formalities. Instead, they
are tasked with deciding the trickier issue of whether the decedent intended
a will to be legally effective. When the issue before the court shifts from the
objective issue of formal compliance to the subjective issue of the decedent’s intent, courts may reach more inconsistent decisions.221 Thus, by
giving courts broader discretion, the harmless error rule interjects potentially greater inconsistency and unpredictability into the testamentary intent
doctrine.
Contrary to the harmless error rule, which relates to the decedent’s operative testamentary intent, the reformation doctrine is concerned with the
decedent’s substantive testamentary intent. Under conventional law, courts
cannot add to, subtract from, or replace the language that the decedent
chose to include in her will.222 Put simply, courts cannot reform a will.223
Instead, courts traditionally take the language of a will as the definitive
expression of the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent,224 and they
interpret the will in accordance with the plain meaning of the decedent’s
chosen words.225 By limiting the court’s ability to decide the decedent’s

218

See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 217, at 4-5.
See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical
Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 393 (2001) (“[T]he harmless error rule . . . reduce[s] the ability to predict
in advance which writings will qualify as wills because [it] rel[ies] on extrinsic evidence of the testator’s
intent rather than formalities alone to establish the testamentary character of an instrument.”). However,
even when purportedly applying the strict compliance requirement, courts may reach inconsistent results. See Glover, supra note 217, at 643.
220 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 184 (explaining that a version of the harmless error
rule has been adopted in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, South
Dakota, Utah, and Virginia).
221 See sources cited supra note 219.
222 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328.
223 Id.
224 See id.; see also supra Section II.C.
225 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328.
219
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substantive testamentary intent in this way, the conventional law fosters
predictable and consistent outcomes.226
In opposition to the conventional law, a push is underway to allow
courts to reform the language of wills in situations that suggests that the
decedent’s chosen words do not accurately reflect her substantive testamentary intent.227 The goal of this change is to avoid inequitable situations in
which the decedent’s property is distributed according to mistakenly drafted
language that inaccurately describes the decedent’s intended testamentary
gifts.228 But while the emergence of the judicial reformation of wills may
better fulfill the decedent’s substantive intent in clear instances of mistaken
draftsmanship, it could also introduce unpredictability into the testamentary
intent doctrine. Like the potential inconsistency produced by allowing
courts to validate formally defective wills,229 greater inconsistency in outcomes may result when courts consider extrinsic evidence of the decedent’s
substantive testamentary intent. Indeed, when courts focus on the subjective
intent of the decedent rather than simply deciphering the plain meaning of
the will’s language, the decedent, her family, and other potential beneficiaries enjoy less certainty and predictability in how the court will interpret the
meaning of the will’s language.230
By increasing judicial discretion in deciding issues of testamentary intent, this overall shift in the law of wills necessitates a clear understanding
of the issues that courts must decide when exercising their discretion. When
testamentary intent is identified and interpreted through formalistic methods, the underlying issues can be obscured and conflated with relatively
little harm. For instance, when applying the strict compliance requirement,
the court need not understand that, through the proxy of formal compliance,
226

Champine, supra note 219, at 401 (“By limiting courts to the unambiguous language of the will,
. . . testators receive assurance that their wishes will not be overturned because they are unpopular. More
generally, the rule-oriented approach offer predictability to all testators, assuring them that their wishes,
if expressed unambiguously, will be respected.”); Scott T. Jarboe, Note, Interpreting A Testator’s Intent
from the Language of Her Will: A Descriptive Linguistics Approach, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1365, 1374
(2002) (“Some courts avoid using extrinsic evidence in interpreting a testator’s intent in order to provide
some predictability to the . . . interpretation of will documents.”).
227 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
228 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 337 (explaining that reformation can “avoid . . .
harsh result[s]” when “there is overwhelming evidence of mistake and the testator’s actual intent”);
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 590 (“So long as it is human to err, instances of mistaken
terms in wills are inevitable. The impulse to remedy these errors in order to prevent unjust enrichment is
also deeply rooted in our sense of justice, which is why the simplistic rule forbidding relief against
mistake [through reformation of the mistakenly drafted language] is dissolving.”).
229 See sources cited supra note 219.
230 See Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Mass. 2000) (“To allow for reformation [of
wills] would . . . lead to untold confusion in the probate of wills.”); Jarboe, Note, supra note 226, at
1374 (“Free use of extrinsic evidence in will interpretations threatens . . . certainty.”); see also supra
note 226 and accompanying text.
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it is deciding the issue of operative testamentary intent.231 But when the
court’s focus is turned to the issues underlying these formalistic proxies, it
must pay greater attention to how the issues are framed and articulated. For
example, when deciding whether to validate a noncompliant will under the
harmless error rule, the court must understand that the issue at hand is
whether the decedent intended the will to be legally effective. If courts are
unsure exactly what they must determine when applying the harmless error
rule, inconsistent outcomes and doctrinal confusion are more likely. Indeed,
without a clear understanding of the underlying issues, courts will add even
greater uncertainty to the determination of testamentary intent.
In sum, the harmless error rule and the reformation doctrine give
courts significantly more discretion in deciding issues of testamentary intent than under traditional law. These changes are representative of a larger
shift within the law of wills from formalistic approaches to deciding issues
of testamentary intent to approaches that give courts broad discretion to
decide such issues. While the need for clarity existed previously, this shift
increases the importance of a well-defined testamentary intent doctrine.232
Guzman nicely summarizes this idea when she advises: “As ‘formalism
falls, intent rises’; as intent rises, heightened care must be afforded to its
contours.”233 With the concerns raised by vesting courts with greater discretion to decide issues of testamentary intent in mind, this final Part demonstrates how this Article’s taxonomy clarifies the theoretical understanding
and practical application of the testamentary intent doctrine.
A.

Harmless Error

Operative testamentary intent refers to the decedent’s intent that a will
be legally effective.234 Courts typically decide this issue by evaluating the
decedent’s compliance with the prescribed formalities of will-execution.235
The decedent’s compliance therefore serves as a proxy for the decedent’s
operative testamentary intent. As just discussed, the harmless error rule
shifts the court’s focus from the objective issue of formal compliance to the
subjective issue underlying the proxy, namely the decedent’s intent.236 It
231

See supra Section II.B. The same is true is true when the court determines the issue of substantive testamentary intent through the application of the plain meaning rule. See supra Section II.C.
232 See Guzman, supra note 9, at 352 (“The need for attention to testamentary intent has become
even more acute over the past two decades, given the increasing recognition of its role in overcoming
execution defects.”); Lindgren, supra note 9, at 1010 (“When under the 1990 Code any document with
testamentary intent qualifies as a will, the doctrine of testamentary intent will play a much greater role in
the law of wills.”).
233 Guzman, supra note 9, at 352.
234 See supra Section II.B.
235 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 153.
236 See supra notes 220-221 and accompanying text.
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does so by allowing the court to validate a formally deficient will if it is
convinced that the decedent intended the will be legally effective.237 With
this shift comes the need to clearly define what issues the court must decide
when excusing a decedent’s noncompliance. Specifically, in order to provide consistency and predictability to the testamentary intent doctrine,
courts must understand that when applying the harmless error rule, they
should focus on the issue of operative testamentary intent.
With this need for clarity in mind, policymakers have attempted to
provide courts explicit guidance regarding the issues of testamentary intent
that arise during the application of the harmless error rule. For example, the
Uniform Probate Code’s (“UPC”) harmless error rule specifically states that
the court can overlook a will-execution defect if “the decedent intended the
document . . . to constitute . . . the decedent’s will.”238 Although this formulation of the harmless error rule could be more precise,239 the official commentary clarifies that the central issue underlying the harmless error rule is
operative testamentary intent.240 The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of
Property have been more specific and have directed the court’s attention
more explicitly toward operative testamentary intent. The Restatement explains: “A harmless error in executing a will may be excused if the proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent adopted
the document as his or her will.”241 By including the phrase, “adopted the
document as his or her will,”242 the Restatement specifically places the
court’s focus on the issue of whether the decedent intended the will to be
legally effective.

237

See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 217, at 4-5.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010).
239 The phrase “intended the document . . . to constitute . . . the decedent’s will” does not explicitly
distinguish operative testamentary intent and donative testamentary intent. Whereas operative testamentary intent focuses on the issue of whether the decedent intended a will to be legally effective, donative
testamentary intent focuses on the issue of whether a document expresses testamentary gifts. Compare
supra Section II.B, with supra Section II.A.
240 The official comment explains that the harmless error rule “permits the proponents of the will to
prove that the defective execution did not result from irresolution or from circumstances suggesting
duress or trickery – in other words, that the defect was harmless to the purpose of the formality.” UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2010) (emphasis added). Because irresolution, duress, and
trickery each involve a situation in which the central question is whether the decedent intended a will to
be legally effective and not whether the document expresses testamentary gifts, the commentary clarifies
that the issue underlying the harmless error rule is operative testamentary intent, not donative testamentary intent.
241 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. LAW
INST. 1999).
242 Id. (emphasis added).
238
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Because the emergence of the harmless error rule is relatively new and
not widespread,243 few state appellate court decisions involving the rule
have been published. In recent years, however, New Jersey appellate courts
have been some of the first to address issues related to the harmless error
rule.244 Because New Jersey is one of the first states in which courts can
look past the proxy of formal compliance and delve directly into the issue
of operative testamentary intent, these recent appellate court cases could
have widespread influence in shaping how courts apply the harmless error
rule.245 Unfortunately, despite the relatively clear articulation of the issues
underlying the harmless error rule, New Jersey courts have added unnecessary complexity and confusion to the testamentary intent doctrine. This
confusion largely stems from the court’s conflation of the various strands of
testamentary intent.
The New Jersey courts’ troubles with the testamentary intent doctrine
are apparent in two recent cases: (1) In re Probate of Will and Codicil of
Macool 246 and (2) In re Estate of Ehrlich.247 In the first case, Louise Macool
visited an attorney for assistance with drafting her will.248 The attorney and
Macool discussed her desired estate plan, and she gave the attorney notes
regarding specific gifts she wanted to make.249 After the meeting, Macool
left the office, and the lawyer began to prepare a draft of the will.250 Macool,
however, was never able to formally execute the will, as she died shortly
after leaving the lawyer’s office.251 The will was submitted for probate, and
because the document did not comply with the prescribed formalities, the
court had to decide whether it satisfied New Jersey’s harmless error rule.252
New Jersey modeled its statute after the UPC’s harmless error rule, authorizing the court to validate a formally defective will “if the proponent of
the document . . . establishes . . . that the decedent intended the document . .
. to constitute . . . the decedent’s will.”253 Thus, despite some ambiguity in
243 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 184 (“In 1990, the harmless error rule was
codified in UPC §2-503 (1990, rev. 1997). Today, some version of the harmless error rule has been
adopted by statute in ten states . . . .”).
244 See infra notes 246-247.
245 See ‘Harmless Error’ Statute Construed, ESTATE PLANNING, Mar. 2011, at 37, 38 (“To the
extent that the Macool decision represents the final say with regard to New Jersey appellate courts’
interpretation of the New Jersey harmless error statute, the decision provides needed clarity and guidance for lower court judges. Indeed the Macool interpretation of Uniform Probate Code section 2-503
may have influence beyond the boundaries of New Jersey.”).
246 3 A.3d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
247 47 A.3d 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
248 In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1262.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. (reporting that Macool “died approximately one hour after her meeting” with the attorney).
252 Id. at 1262-63.
253 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2007).

606

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 23:3

the wording of the statute,254 the central issue under New Jersey’s harmless
error rule, like the key issue under the UPC’s harmless error rule, is operative testamentary intent.255 Nonetheless, the court in Macool added a secondary component to the harmless error analysis when it held: “[F]or a
writing to be admitted into probate as a will under [New Jersey’s harmless
error statute], the proponent of the writing . . . must prove . . . that: (1) the
decedent actually reviewed the document in question; and (2) thereafter
gave his or her final assent to it.”256
The second prong of the Macool court’s holding essentially restates
the statute’s requirement that the proponent establish that the decedent intended the document to be her will. If the decedent did not give her “final
assent” to the will,257 she did not “intend[] the document or writing to constitute [her] will.”258 Thus, the second prong of Macool’s harmless error
analysis focuses on the key issue of operative testamentary intent. By contrast, the first prong of the holding in Macool adds an additional requirement, specifically that the decedent reviewed the will.259 The connection
between this component of the harmless error analysis and operative testamentary intent is not clear. The decedent’s review of the will certainly can
serve as evidence that the decedent intended the will to be legally effective.
However, the decedent could intend a document that she did not review to
constitute a legally effective will. Indeed, the law traditionally imposes no
general requirement that the decedent review the will prior to execution.260
Because Macool’s second prong of the harmless error analysis specifically
requires the court to decide whether the decedent intended the document to
constitute a legally effective will, the first prong is apparently unrelated to
operative testamentary intent.

254

See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
The court initially characterizes the primary issue in terms of operative testamentary intent
when it states: “The [trial] court found, however, that plaintiff failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the decedent intended the document denoted . . . as a ‘rough’ draft to be her last and
binding will.” In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1264. Indeed, the phrase “last and binding will” makes clear that
the relevant issue is whether the decedent intended the will to be legally effective.
256 Id. at 1265.
257 Id.
258 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2007).
259 In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1265.
260 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). Although the UPC and the Restatement do
not contain an explicit requirement that the decedent review a will, some cases seem to suggest that such
a requirement exists. See, e.g., Chavez v. Mendoza (In re Estate of Mendoza), 356 P.2d 13, 16 (Nev.
1960) (“It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to
the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.”). However, these cases
are better understood as suggesting that a decedent’s review of a will and her understanding of its contents is simply one type of evidence of operative testamentary intent. See In re Estate of Turpin, 19 A.3d
801, 805-07 (D.C. 2011).
255
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Although the requirement that the decedent review the will cannot be
fully explained by concerns regarding operative testamentary intent, the
requirement makes more sense in the context of substantive testamentary
intent. As previously explained, substantive testamentary intent refers to the
decedent’s intent to make specific testamentary gifts.261 If the decedent did
not review the will prior to death, the possibility increases that the will does
not reflect the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent. The lawyer could
have made mistakes while drafting the will, or the decedent could have
changed her mind regarding specific gifts. Because a decedent might make
last minute changes or bring mistakes to the drafting lawyer’s attention, a
requirement that the decedent review the will before the court can excuse a
formal defect increases the likelihood that the will reflects her substantive
testamentary intent. In fact, the court in Macool seems to explicitly recognize that the added requirement is most concerned with substantive testamentary intent when it explains that without the added requirement “a trier
of fact can only speculate as to whether the proposed writing accurately
reflects the decedent’s final testamentary wishes.”262
The second case in which the New Jersey courts focus on both operative testamentary intent and substantive testamentary intent is In re Estate
of Ehrlich.263 After Ehrlich’s death, a search of his home and office produced no original will.264 However, his family did discover a copy on which
Ehrlich indicated that he had sent the original to his executor.265 Unfortunately, the executor had predeceased Ehrlich, and the original will was never recovered.266 Ehrlich’s family submitted the copy for probate, but because it did not comply with the prescribed will-execution formalities, the
court was charged with deciding whether it could excuse the will’s defects
under the New Jersey harmless error statute.267 Guided by the decision in
Macool,268 the court explained that “to overcome the deficiencies in formality,” New Jersey’s harmless error rule “places on the proponent of the
defective instrument the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the document was [(1)] in fact reviewed by the testator, [(2)]

261

See supra Section II.C.
In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1265. The court elsewhere expresses similar concern: “Decedent’s
untimely demise prevented her from reading the draft will prepared by her attorney. She never had the
opportunity . . . to clear up any ambiguity, modify any provision, or express her final assent to this
‘rough’ draft.” Id. at 1264. Without the decedent’s opportunity to clarify or modify the will, the court
has less assurance that that the will reflects her substantive testamentary intent.
263 In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 15-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
264 Id. at 14.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 15-16.
268 In re Prob. of Will & Codicil of Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010);
see also supra notes 253-256 and accompanying text.
262
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expresses his or her testamentary intent, and [(3)] was thereafter assented to
by the testator.”269
A careful comparison of Macool and Ehrlich reveals that the latter
seems to graft an additional requirement on the former’s holding.270 Again,
to the requirement that the decedent intend the will to be legally effective,
Macool adds the requirement that the decedent review the will.271 Ehrlich
follows suit and requires that the decedent both review the will and give her
final assent to it, but it also requires the court to find that the will “expresses
[the decedent’s] testamentary intent.”272
Although the meaning of this additional prong of the harmless error
analysis is unclear in isolation, the court’s discussion of whether the will’s
proponent satisfied this requirement suggests that it is concerned with the
decedent’s substantive testamentary intent. Indeed, after finding that Ehrlich had reviewed the will and assented to it,273 the court focuses on whether
the will accurately describes his intended estate plan. The court explains
that “[t]he unrefuted proof is that decedent intended [his nephew] to be the
primary, if not exclusive, beneficiary of his estate, an objective the purported Will effectively accomplishes.”274 It continues: “Lest there be any doubt,
in the years following the drafting of this document, . . . decedent repeatedly orally acknowledged and confirmed the [will’s] dispositionary contents .
. . .”275 Ultimately, the court’s focus on Ehrlich’s substantive testamentary
intent is clearest when it concludes that the unexecuted document “accurately reflects his final testamentary wishes.”276
While additional safeguards related to the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent could be advantageous, their inclusion within the harmless
269

In re Ehrlich, 47 A.3d at 18.
Compare In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1265, with In re Ehrlich, 47 A.3d at 18.
271 See In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1265; see also supra notes 253-262 and accompanying text.
272 In re Ehrlich, 47 A.3d at 18.
273 Id. (“[D]ecedent undeniably prepared and reviewed the challenged document. . . . ‘[E]ven if the
original for some reason was not signed by him, through some oversight or negligence[,] his dated
notation that he mailed the original to his executor is clearly his written assent of his intention that the
document was his Last Will and Testament.’” (quoting In re Estate of Ehrlich, No. BUR-P-2009-2542,
2011 WL 10843131, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 6, 2011))).
274 Id. (“[T]he evidence strongly suggests that this remained decedent’s testamentary intent
throughout the remainder of his life.”).
275 Id.
276 Id. at 19. In addition to extensively discussing Ehrlich’s substantive testamentary intent, the
court also seems to include his donative testamentary intent in the harmless error analysis. For example,
the court first explains: “In disposing of his entire estate and making specific bequests, the purported
Will . . . expresses sufficient testamentary intent.” Id. at 18. Moreover, the court continues: “As the
motion judge noted, in its form, the document ‘is clearly a professionally prepared Will and complete in
every respect except for a date and its execution.’” Id. This discussion relates not to whether Ehrlich
intended the will to be legally effective but instead to whether the document expresses testamentary
gifts. In other words, the court is focusing not on definitive testamentary intent but on donative testamentary intent. See supra Section II.A.
270
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error rule leads to inconsistent outcomes across factually similar cases. Under conventional law, the proponent of a formally compliant will does not
have to independently establish that the will accurately expresses the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent.277 Instead, in cases in which the decedent complies with the formalities of will-execution, the court typically
presumes that the decedent reviewed the will prior to execution and that the
will accurately reflects her intended estate plan.278 Thus, under New Jersey
law, the way a will’s proponent establishes that the decedent intended the
will to be legally effective affects how the court decides whether the will
accurately describes the decedent’s testamentary gifts. When operative testamentary intent is established through the decedent’s formal compliance,
the court presumes that the will reflects the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent, but when the will’s proponent establishes operative testamentary intent with extrinsic evidence under the harmless error rule, the
will’s proponent must also establish the decedent’s substantive testamentary
intent through extrinsic evidence.279
A possible justification for this inconsistency is that cases of faulty execution present a greater risk that the purported will does not accurately
describe the decedent’s intended estate plan. In cases like Macool in which
the decedent never attempted to execute the will,280 the presumption that the
will accurately reflects the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent may
not be warranted because the decedent never had the opportunity to review
the will. Indeed, the court’s analysis in Macool supports this view. The
court reasons that Macool “never had the opportunity to confer with counsel after reviewing the document to clear up any ambiguity [or] to modify
any provision,” and therefore her “untimely death deprives us of any reasonably reliable means of determining . . . whether she would have

277 In fact, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, the court will validate a formally compliant
will even when it is convinced that the will does not accurately reflect the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent. See Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (Mass. 1933) (“A will duly executed and
allowed by the court must . . . be accepted as the final expression of the intent of the person executing it.
The fact that it was not in conformity to the instructions given to the draftsman who prepared it or that
he made a mistake does not authorize a court to reform or alter it or remould it by amendments.”);
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328 (“Under [the no reformation] rule, courts may not reform a will to correct a mistaken term to reflect what the testator intended the will to say.”).
278 E.g., Griffith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466, 486 (1879) (“Knowledge of its contents is, of
course, essential to the validity of every will, but where the testamentary capacity is unquestioned, such
knowledge, as a general rule, will be inferred from the execution of the will itself.”); see also
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328 (“[C]ompliance with the Wills Act establishes a conclusive validation of the written words of the will that may not be challenged on the basis of extrinsic
evidence of a different intent.”).
279 See supra notes 253-276 and accompanying text.
280 In re Prob. of Will & Codicil of Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010);
see also supra notes 248-252 and accompanying text.
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viewed . . . the draft will as written as acceptable.”281 The additional requirements imposed by New Jersey courts related to the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent might therefore be warranted because formally defective wills provide less assurance that they accurately describe the decedent’s intended testamentary gifts.
However, most instances in which courts could be tasked with applying the harmless error rule do not involve the complete absence of formality, but instead involve cases of botched will-executions. Indeed, most cases
where the court would be asked to decide the issue of operative testamentary intent based upon extrinsic evidence are not cases like Macool, where
the decedent did not attempt to execute the will, but are instead cases in
which the decedent attempted to comply with the formalities of willexecution but failed due to mistake or ignorance.282 In these situations, the
decedent has just as much opportunity to review the will as cases in which
the decedent successfully completed the will-execution ceremony, and as
such, the same presumption that the will accurately describes the decedent’s
substantive testamentary intent should apply. Moreover, even cases like
Macool that involve no attempt of will-execution are not that troublesome.
Because in these cases the court would likely never find that the decedent
intended the will to be legally effective,283 the issue of whether the unexecuted document reflects the decedent’s true substantive testamentary intent
would seldom have to be addressed.
Thus, the difference in the way that a will’s proponent establishes substantive testamentary intent under New Jersey law can lead to different out281 In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1264-65 (“Although the will drafted by [the lawyer] reflects one possible interpretation of decedent’s otherwise cryptic and ambiguous reference, we cannot conclude, with
any degree of reasonable certainty, that this approach would have met with decedent’s approval.”); see
also supra note 262 and accompanying text.
282 See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 855, 880 (2012) (“Most disputes over execution formalities . . . , at least based on reported
decisions, seem to involve technical defects or obvious mistakes . . . .”). The court itself acknowledges
that the Macool case involves extraordinary circumstances. In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1260-61 (“In his
opening remarks before the trial court, plaintiff’s counsel characterized this case as one that ‘challenges
the chancellor.’ We agree. The facts underlying this case are so uniquely challenging that they have the
feel of an academic exercise, designed by a law professor to test the limits of a student’s understanding
of probate law.”).
283 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“The requirement of a writing is so fundamental to the purpose of the execution
formalities that it cannot be excused as harmless . . . . Among the defects in execution that can be excused, the lack of a signature is the hardest to excuse. An unsigned will raises a serious but not insuperable doubt about whether the testator adopted the document as his or her will.”); Langbein, Curing
Execution Errors, supra note 215, at 30-31 (“Not only is the harmless error rule never applied to excuse
compliance with the writing requirement, it is also virtually never applied to excuse compliance with the
signature requirement. One of the things that you are free to do with a will that has been drafted for you
is to decide not to execute it. Failure to sign the will is seldom harmless, because it raises a grave doubt
about whether the testator intended the instrument to be his or her will.”).
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comes in cases that present equivalent evidence of the decedent’s intent.
When operative testamentary intent is established by the decedent’s formal
compliance, the court presumes that the will accurately reflects the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent because she had an opportunity to
review the will.284 Accordingly, the court will validate a formally compliant
will even when there is no direct evidence that the decedent reviewed the
will. By contrast, when the decedent’s operative testamentary intent is established through extrinsic evidence under the harmless error rule, the court
will invalidate the will in cases without direct evidence that the decedent
reviewed the will.285 In both instances, the decedent intended the will to be
legally effective and had the opportunity to review the will, yet the court
will validate the will in one instance and invalidate the will in the other.
In sum, New Jersey’s early experience with the harmless error rule illustrates the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the meaning of testamentary intent. This lack of a clearly defined testamentary intent doctrine
has resulted in New Jersey courts adding unnecessary complexity to the
harmless error analysis. Instead of focusing on the central issue of operative
testamentary intent, the courts have misguidedly delved into the separate
issue of substantive testamentary intent.286 In addition to deciding whether a
decedent intended a formally defective will to be legally effective,287 New
Jersey courts have added a determination of whether the purported will
accurately describes the decedent’s intended estate plan to the harmless
error analysis.288 This additional requirement could lead to unpredictable
application of the rule and inconsistent outcomes.289 This Article’s taxonomy of testamentary intent, however, clearly identifies operative testamentary intent as the appropriate issue under the harmless error analysis,290 and
thereby provides clarity to courts charged with applying the harmless error
rule and promotes consistency across similar cases.
B.

Reformation

Substantive testamentary intent refers to the decedent’s intent to make
specific testamentary gifts through the terms of her will.291 Under conventional law, courts interpret the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent by
284

See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253-276 and accompanying text.
286 See In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); In re Macool, 3
A.3d at 1265; see also supra notes 253-276 and accompany text.
287 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2007).
288 See In re Ehrlich, 47 A.3d at 18; In re Macool, 3 A.3d at 1265; see also supra notes 259-262,
273-276 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
290 See supra Section II.B.
291 See supra Section II.C.
285
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discerning the plain meaning of the decedent’s will.292 As a result, courts
traditionally take the will’s language as the final expression of the decedent’s intended estate plan, and they do not consider extrinsic evidence that
suggests the will’s language does not accurately reflect her substantive testamentary intent.293 But as explained above, there is a push to move away
from the conventional law and to allow courts to reform a will when extrinsic evidence suggests that the will’s language does not accurately describe
the decedent’s intended testamentary gifts.294 The emergence of the reformation doctrine shifts the court’s focus from the plain meaning of the will’s
language to the underlying issue of the decedent’s intent.
Although opponents of the reformation doctrine present several arguments for retaining the conventional law’s focus on the will’s plain meaning,295 one particular argument is based upon a conflated understanding of
the various strands of testamentary intent. Specifically, when refusing to
reform mistaken language in wills, courts frequently explain that the reformation doctrine would circumvent the requirement that a will comply with
the prescribed will-execution formalities.296 For example, one New York
Surrogate’s Court explains:
It is axiomatic that in construing Wills, courts should not rewrite them. To permit a draftsman to tell us, often years after a Will has been signed, what it is supposed to say (which, in
many instances, we fear, will amount to what it should have said, rather than what it does

292

See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328; Cornelison, supra note 185, at 814.
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328; see also supra Section II.C.
294 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also supra notes 227-228 and
accompanying text.
295 E.g., Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Mass. 2000) (“Strong policy reasons also
militate against the requested reformation. To allow for reformation in this case would open the floodgates of litigation . . . . The number of groundless will contests would soar.”); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF,
supra note 44, at 328 (“The usual justification for these rules is the worst evidence problem. Because a
testator is unable to corroborate or refute extrinsic evidence of intent that is at odds with the words of
her will, she is protected from fraud and error by categorically excluding such evidence.”); Joseph W.
deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners’ Errors: The Argument for Reformation, 40
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (“Reformation would . . . weaken the internal structure of the formalism of
estate law.”).
296 See, e.g., In re Last Will and Testament of Daland, No. 2920-MA, 2010 WL 716160, at *4
(Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2010) (“[I]n order to reform the 2003 Will . . . the court would have to rewrite the
will . . . . Petitioner nonetheless argues that, like trusts, wills can be reformed on the basis of mistake. . .
. Petitioner, however, has ignored a significant distinction between wills and trusts: there are statutory
[formalities] for the execution of wills.”); Flannery, 738 N.E.2d, at 746 (“[T]he reformation of a will,
which would dispose of estate property based on unattested testamentary language, would violate the
Statute of Wills.”); see also Cornelison, supra note 185, at 817.
293
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say), is to risk allowing him to rewrite it, abrogating the statutes of Wills and effectively rein297
troducing the discarded concept of oral Wills.

Thus, under this view, the reformation doctrine is inappropriate because when courts consider extrinsic evidence of the decedent’s substantive
testamentary intent, they in essence validate oral wills, which do not satisfy
the conventional law’s requirements that a will be written, signed, and witnessed.298
Although courts continue to rely upon this unattested language argument when refusing to reform wills,299 Professors John Langbein and Lawrence Waggoner presented a persuasive critique of this argument more than
three decades ago.300 Drawing a connection to previous scholarship related
to the reformation of contracts,301 Langbein and Waggoner argue that allowing courts to reform wills based upon extrinsic evidence of the decedent’s
intent does not amount to the recognition of oral wills.302 They explain:
“Whereas an oral will instances total noncompliance with the Wills Act
formalities, a duly executed will with a mistakenly rendered term involves
high levels of compliance with both the letter and the purpose of the Wills
Act formalities.”303 Under this view, a fundamental difference distinguishes
admitting extrinsic evidence to establish the existence of an oral will from
considering extrinsic evidence that suggests a properly executed will does
not accurately reflect the decedent’s intended estate plan.
At the heart of Langbein and Waggoner’s argument is the notion that
the formalities of will-execution and the reformation doctrine are concerned
with different strands of testamentary intent. On the one hand, a duly executed will assures the court that the decedent intended it to be a legally effective expression of her estate plan,304 or, put in terms of this Article’s taxonomy, the purpose of will-execution formalities is to provide evidence of
297 In re Estate of Campbell, 655 N.Y.S.2d 913, 920 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1997) (quoting In re Estate of
Jean Northcott (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Sept. 21, 1995) (unpublished opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
298 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 328 (“It is sometimes . . . said that admitting evidence of intent other than the language of the will would violate the requirement of the Wills Act that a
testamentary disposition be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested by witnesses.”); Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 68, at 528 (“When the particular mistake that has affected a will is one that would
require a court to supply an omitted term or to substitute language outside the will in place of a mistaken
term, the objection arises that the language to be supplied was not written, signed, and attested as required by the Wills Act. In these cases reformation would appear to have the courts interpolating unattested language into the will.”).
299 See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
300 See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 567-71.
301 Id. Specifically, Langbein and Waggoner rely upon the work of Professor George Palmer. See
generally George E. Palmer, Reformation and the Statute of Frauds, 65 MICH. L. REV. 421 (1967);
George E. Palmer, Reformation and the Parol Evidence Rule, 65 MICH. L. REV. 833 (1967).
302 Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 567-71.
303 Id. at 569.
304 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 153; Langbein, supra note 7, at 514-15.
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the decedent’s operative testamentary intent.305 On the other hand, the
reformation doctrine is concerned with the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent. When considering whether to reform a will, the court must decide whether the will accurately describes the decedent’s intended testamentary dispositions.306 Although Langbein and Waggoner do not explicitly
refer to the distinction between these different strands of testamentary intent, they hint at it when they explain: “In the typical case of mistaken
terms, there has been due execution and the issue is the meaning or completeness of a single disputed term. In such circumstances the finality of the
testator’s intent is not in question . . . .”307
Thus, when courts invoke the unattested language argument when refusing to reform wills, they conflate different issues of testamentary intent.
Under conventional law, a will must be written, signed, and attested to ensure that the decedent intended it to be legally effective.308 When a court
considers extrinsic evidence in a reformation case, it does not rely on the
unattested language to establish the decedent’s operative testamentary intent. Indeed, the decedent’s completion of the will-execution ceremony has
already settled this issue. Instead, the unattested language is used to resolve
a different issue, namely the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent.309
Consideration of extrinsic evidence in reformation cases therefore does not
undermine the requirement that a will be properly executed because the
reformation doctrine and the will-execution ceremony are concerned with
two distinct issues of testamentary intent.
Ultimately, judicial conflation of the various strands of testamentary
intent has caused both practical misapplication of the harmless error rule
and theoretical misunderstanding of the reformation doctrine. In New Jersey, courts have added unnecessary complication to the harmless error rule
out of concern regarding the decedent’s substantive testamentary intent
when, instead, the focus of the harmless error analysis should be on the
decedent’s operative testamentary intent.310 Similarly, courts have conflated
operative testamentary intent and substantive testamentary intent when considering whether to reform wills that contain mistaken terms. Although the
reformation doctrine is concerned solely with whether the will’s language
305

See supra Section II.B.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003) (“A donative document, though unambiguous, may be reformed to conform the text to
the donor’s intention if it is established by clear and convincing evidence (1) that a mistake of fact or
law, whether in expression or inducement, affected specific terms of the document; and (2) what the
donor’s intention was.”); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 529 n.27 (“The question in a mistake
case is whether an instrument that otherwise satisfies the letter and spirit of the Wills Act fails in one
particular to evidence the testator’s intended disposition.”).
307 Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 570.
308 See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
309 See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 68, at 570-71.
310 See supra Section III.A.
306
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accurately describes the decedent’s intended testamentary dispositions,
courts have relied upon an argument that focuses on the decedent’s operative testamentary intent when refusing to adopt the reformation doctrine.311
As these examples illustrate, courts have consistently struggled with issues
of testamentary intent.312 Going forward, however, this Article’s taxonomy
can provide guidance to courts that grapple with the harmless error rule, the
reformation doctrine, and other areas within the law of wills that involve
the identification and interpretation of the decedent’s intent.
CONCLUSION
Testamentary intent is a fundamental yet elusive concept within the
law of wills. Courts and scholars consistently espouse the importance of
testamentary intent, but a clear and consistent understanding of the term has
failed to develop. As Professor Kathleen Guzman explains, a “haphazardly
defined and applied” testamentary intent doctrine has produced “jurisprudential incoherence.”313 This incoherence likely will continue to grow as
courts are granted greater discretion to identify and interpret the decedent’s
intent.314 The goal of this Article is therefore to cultivate jurisprudential
coherence within the law of wills by systematically defining the primary
strands of testamentary intent and by encouraging deliberate application of
the rules and doctrines that guide courts when deciding issues of testamentary intent.
This Article’s taxonomy identifies three independent strands of testamentary intent. The first is donative testamentary intent, which focuses on
whether a purported will describes gifts that become effective upon death.315
When wills are professionally drafted, this strand is rarely at issue, but
when decedents prepare informal documents without legal assistance,
courts must at times decide whether the decedent intended a document to be
a will or something else, such as a letter or an expression of lifetime gifts.316
The second strand is operative testamentary intent, which focuses on
whether the decedent intended a purported will to be legally effective.317
Even if a purported will clearly describes testamentary gifts, the court must
decide whether the decedent intended the document to be a legally enforceable expression of those gifts.318 Finally, the third strand of testamentary
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318

See supra Section III.B.
See also supra Section I.A.
Guzman, supra note 9, at 307; accord supra Section I.A.
See supra notes 227-233 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra notes 141-149 and accompanying text.
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intent is substantive testamentary intent.319 This strand focuses on the substance of the specific gifts that are described in a will. Once the court decides that a purported will describes testamentary gifts and that the decedent intended the expression of those gifts to be legally effective, the court
must identify the specific gifts that the decedent intended to make through
the terms of the will.320
Thus, while courts and scholars frequently discuss testamentary intent
as a single concept, conflating and entangling the various strands, testamentary intent actually encompasses three related but distinct issues. The confusion regarding the contours of testamentary intent has caused both practical misapplication and theoretical misunderstanding of various aspects of
the law of wills. However, with this Article’s taxonomy in place, a more
consistent testamentary intent doctrine might emerge and a deeper understanding of the role of the decedent’s intent within the law of wills can develop.
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See supra Section II.C.
See supra notes 179-190 and accompanying text.

